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Forest Policy and Community-Based Conservation  
In the Democratic Republic of Congo 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction. 
 
 The rainforest cover of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) remains as 
one of the last vestiges of predominantly untouched forest cover in the world, second in size 
only to the Brazilian Amazon rainforest.  The DRC is home to half of Africa’s, and an eighth 
of the globe’s, remaining dense forest cover.i  As such a large fraction of the earth’s 
remaining forest cover, DRC deforestation will have a global environmental impact.  Trees – 
particularly those of the size and density of the DRC’s forests – absorb greenhouse gases, 
and cutting them down will not only prevent this absorption, but cause carbon releases into 
the atmosphere through the process of carbon sequestration.ii  So far, logging titles have 
been granted covering over 20 million hectares out of the 60 million hectares of forest landiii 
and, if logging goes ahead as planned, an estimated 34.4 billion tons of CO2 will be emitted 
by the year 2050.iv  Furthermore, forest canopy cover helps retain soil moisture, necessary 
for forest health and for the area’s water cycle.  Logging of the DRC’s rainforests would 
therefore have global environmental consequences, and preservation of this vital resource is 
necessary to maintain the forest’s current role in the earth’s environmental cycle. 
Political instability in the DRC has prevented intensive logging from taking place 
thus far, with traditional forest still covering more than a quarter of the country.v  The high 
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level of concessions is in part due the DRC’s political limbo between 1996 and 2000.  For 
these four years the country was under the control of an interim government.  Power had 
been taken from General Mobutu, though the new democratic state had not yet been 
established.  The interim government therefore had little interest in valuing the country’s 
natural resources at their full worth, as they saw no interest in the long-term conservation of 
resources they knew they would soon lose.  Moves were therefore made to acquire short-
term profits.  During this period, concealed by the distractions of violence and political 
strife, logging concessions for large patches of land were sold at highly undervalued prices, 
mostly to foreign companies.  Until 2003 a 200,000-hectare logging title could be purchased 
for just US$286, spurring an onslaught of concessionaires eager to take advantage of an 
opportunity they correctly perceived as having a limited timeline.  Some companies then 
lacking the funds or infrastructure to log the land themselves still purchased titles with the 
intention of subleasing once political stability was regained.vi  Furthermore, extensive logging 
titles were awarded during times of war and political strife in the DRC, of which there were 
many.  In the period between General Mobutu’s loss of power in 1996 and the 2006 
democratic parliamentary elections the DRC was characterized as a “battleground in a fight 
for control of natural resources”.vii  
The DRC necessitates urgent attention as much of the forest has been earmarked for 
rapid exploitation, though due to political strife and World Bank intervention, this level of 
exploitation has not yet taken place.  However, this does not mean that deforestation has not 
begun.  Data from the 1999 to 2000 period indicates a gross rate of deforestation of 0.25 
percent.viii  This data focuses on “hot spots” centered on aforementioned areas of high 
population density and, consequently, higher resource use.  Invalidating the granted 
concessions is problematic as many were accorded legally, and though Greenpeace has 
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undertaken an in depth investigation into the illegal concessions, the resource extraction 
industry “remains little more than a smokescreen for business as usual”.ix  Better forestry 
policies and practices are therefore essential in preserving what is ultimately a global natural 
resource. 
The population of the DRC is unevenly distributed, with large numbers living in a 
few densely populated areas dotted across the nation.x  This means that resource needs are 
abnormally high in a few select areas, which are already relatively degraded from past use and 
are being put under greater pressure as the population grows.  The population of the DRC is 
growing at a rate of 3 percent of the current population per year, though this number 
fluctuates greatly in the East of the country, where conflict within neighboring countries 
brings sporadic insurgences of refugees.xi  This influences the economy in the East, which is 
centered on cross-border commerce and is therefore “perturbed by the systematic 
racketeering of different armed groups” and “massive movements of populations fleeing the 
abuses”.xii  According to the Ministry of Environment, Conservation of Nature and Tourism, 
this sporadic disruption prevents development of the agricultural sector and agricultural 
surplus creation, which the Ministry deems necessary for reduction of deforestation.xiii  The 
Ministry also cites poverty and technological factors as indirect causes of deforestation, as 
much of the population not located in the East practice subsistence agriculture, with poverty 
preventing them from investing in agricultural technology that would make their methods 
more productive using less land.   
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2. History, Background and Causes 
 
History of the DRC and the Effects on Deforestation 
 
 The current status of forestry policy and governance in the DRC is inextricably 
rooted in the nation’s political past.  The DRC’s history is one of frequent violence and 
conflict, escalated by similar conflicts in neighboring Rwanda.  This has also impacted 
demographic growth and subsequent land rights issues through influxes of wartime refugees.   
Despite the country’s newly democratic leadership, policy structures hold shadows of 
General Mobutu’s rule.  Mobutu seized power in 1965, killing former Prime Minister Patrice 
Lumumba and renaming himself ‘Sese Seko’ and the country ‘Zaire’.  The country was rife 
with conflict during the entirety of his reign, due in part to his oppressive leadership.  
Rwandan militia invaded the country in 1997 in an attempt to flush out extremist Hutu 
militias.  Rebels rallied against Mobutu and violently installed Laurent Kabila as President, 
sparking conflict between Kabila and other factions, with Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia 
backing Kabila against Rwanda and Uganda.  This turned the newly named DRC into a “vast 
battleground” that continued in the form of sporadic coups and militia advancement until 
Rwandan troops were brought in by the DRC government to aid in quelling the Rwandan 
Hutu rebel militia.xiv   
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 Mobutu’s 1973 General Property Law nationalized all land in the country in an effort 
to marginalize traditional authority, though while he spurred on a few farms that he touted 
as show-pieces for propaganda, the agricultural and forestry sectors as a whole received little 
attention.xv His policies between 1992 and 1996 heavily impacted notions of national 
citizenship, using citizenship issues as a “weapon of choice for destabilizing the democracy 
movement”.xvi  In order to weaken democratization processes Mobutu drew divisions 
between what he termed “native” and “non-native” groups. xvii  This fostered anti-sentiment 
against descendants of post-colonial Rwandan refugees, many of whom were fairing well 
economically.xviii Mahmood Mamdani coined the term “the crisis of post-colonial 
citizenship” to characterize the era’s citizenship confusion.xix  Terms such as native and 
indigenous are used flippantly when discussing citizenship issues in the DRC, usually 
because it is impossible to distinguish which groups preceded another, and whether this 
should even be grounds for citizenship.  The Banyarwandans – the general term used for 
refugees from Rwanda, including Hutus and Tutsis – were often stigmatized during this 
period, despite many groups having descended from families that had immigrated many 
generations ago.   
 The 1960 elections necessitated a more concrete elucidation of who did and did not 
possess citizenship.  Eligibility to vote was formally granted to anyone who had lived in the 
Congo for over ten years, but formal citizenship remained uncertain.xx  Being a descendent 
of an ethnic group with land claims predating the 1885 territorial boundaries became a factor 
in obtaining citizenship, despite a 1972 Presidential decree having granted citizenship to all 
living and continuing to live in the DRC since January 1950.xxi  These different determinants 
created confusion regarding citizenship eligibility and allowed for exclusion of some groups 
by blurring the lines of citizenship.  For instance, Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja notes a “total 
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denial of the very right of citizenship” to people of Rwandan origin, even if they were direct 
descendants of groups living within territorial boundaries.xxii  Similarly, people of the 
Kasaiian groups living within the Katanga region are regarded as non-citizens because they 
are from a different province of origin, despite otherwise fulfilling citizenship 
requirements.xxiii  These citizenship issues caused great tension between groups living in 
proximity to one and other, sometimes escalating to violence.  For instance, a 1993 land 
rights dispute between Kivu agriculturalists and Banyarwandans escalated to violence, 
leaving thousands dead and 140,000 displaced.xxiv Citizenship was based on vague tribal 
distinctions that led to unclear and problematic land rights designations.  Conflict between 
groups emerged, and lack of clarity of group distinctions exacerbated these tensions.   
 
The Political Interim Period 
 
This interim period was characterized by corruption and political nepotism.  At its 
founding, it involved an initially promising cooperation between leaders of groups previously 
opposed to one and other in the second Congolese war.  This ‘Sun City Agreement’ 
established a “power-sharing arrangement” to be implemented concurrently with the 
leadership of President Joseph Kabila.xxv  The agreement granted each signatory a 
proportionate number of seats in the National Assembly and Senate, shares of government 
ministries, and top- tier positions in the army and police sectors.  The signatories – the 
president and his four vice-presidents – were solely in charge of appointing members to 
these positions, with no further or external oversight.  The structure of the agreement 
effectively did away with all of the checks and balances upon which sound governance is 
based.  Opportunities for corruption emerged and office-holders could be sure of immunity 
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so long as they retained friendly relationships with their respective leaders, rendering political 
patronage effectively more influential than actual merit.xxvi   
 With such an acute awareness of the temporary nature of the agreement, politician’s 
motivations were inevitably sullied and political priorities centered on power plays and 
economic gains in order to finance participation in the upcoming elections.  These 
motivations, coupled with complete lack of oversight, led to a corruption free-for-all, and 
recent IMF analyses of the period noted “large fiscal slippages” including wage increases and 
spending in favor of political institutions totaling almost 2.5 percent of the country’s annual 
GDP.xxvii  The IMF report cites corruption as the primary obstacle to successful financial 
management and confirms that internal and external oversight mechanisms at the time were 
at best weak and at worst entirely dysfunctional.xxviii  The hiring of civil servants during the 
period has been characterized as complete anarchy, with positions being granted 
nepotistically and with little attention to professional merit.xxix  “Phantom” employees were 
added to payrolls to garner extra funding, which managers would pocket.xxx  This new civil 
servant force was poorly trained and poorly equipped, and paid a menial and irregularly paid 
salary ranging from US$6 to US$26, rendering them the lowest paid civil servants globally.xxxi  
In a country where the average living costs for a family of seven was estimated at US$380, 
such pittances inevitably bred corruption, and the civil servant salaries became widely known 
as ‘Salaire Insuffisant Difficilement Acquise’ – insufficient salary which is painfully earned.xxxii   
 This context of political chaos is vital for understanding how so many logging 
concessions were granted at such a low price in so short a period of time.  For these 
“warlords turned politicians”, the Sun City Agreement and the subsequent structure of 
interim political rule did little to warrant attention to the ongoing illicit exploitation of the 
country’s resources.xxxiii  In The Rotten Institution: Corruption in Natural Resource Management, Paul 
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Robbins poses a neo-classical interpretation of the undervaluing of resources in a corrupt 
setting, stating that in a closed, extra-legal market setting, such as the DRC’s interim period, 
valuations are not based in accordance with a general open market, but instead are based in 
non-economic relationships between the exchangers.  The seller in a corrupt market setting 
has no permanent or real right to the good, and is therefore likely to undervalue it.  In this 
case the interim government was acutely aware of the fleeting nature of its hold of the 
country’s resources, and therefore had no incentive to preserve the resource, either for later 
economic use or for resource conservation in and of itself.  Concessions were therefore 
granted often and at strikingly low prices.  During the period, logging titles covering 
200,000-hectare logging titles could be bought for just $286.  Companies quickly seized land 
plots in an attempt to gain concession at low prices they correctly perceived as having a 
limited timeline.xxxiv  Indeed, many companies then lacking the infrastructure or economic 
ability to log the land at the time still took advantage of this period of low sale costs and 
purchased titles with intent to sublease once political stability was regained.xxxv  The 
temporary nature of governance and the political chaos that manifested itself during those 
few years provided both a stimulus and a cover for ‘looting’ of the DRC’s forest resources. 
On average, 60 percent of the nation’s annual budget comes from donor aid,xxxvi 
much of which is contributed by the World Bank, having given $4 billion in “loans, credits 
and grants” by 2006.xxxvii  In 2002 the World Bank dramatically decreased its funding because 
conditionalities were not met, and urged the DRC government to impose a moratorium on 
logging concessions during the interim period, banning “allocation, renewal and extension of 
validity” of logging permits.xxxviii  A Ministerial Decree established the moratorium in May 
2002, and an Inter-Ministerial Commission (IMC) was established as overseer of moratorium 
enforcement.xxxix  Yet a 2005 World Bank review noted “serious irregularities” in the rule’s 
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enforcement, and called on the IMC to undertake a sweeping analysis of titles granted since 
the moratorium.  In November 2008, the IMC rejected 91 of the 156 logging titles granted 
during the period.xl  However, allowing 65 of the titles accorded in breach of the moratorium 
has brought harsh criticism to the IMC, particularly from vocal environmental groups such 
as Greenpeace.  These 65 upheld concessions are said to cover 9.7 million hectares of land, 
though GIS mapping indicates the actual figure to be closer to 12.6 million hectares.xli  
Allowing these permits to be converted into long-term concession contractsxlii despite having 
been granted in breach of the moratorium flies in the face of the World Bank’s attempts to 
control logging.  An SAIIA report concluded many of these concessions were merely 
forestry “swaps”, in which companies exchanged older forest areas for newer, more 
productive ones.xliii Furthermore, some companies, such as Trans-M, seized rights over the 
areas freed from the concessions cancelled for being in breach of the moratorium, making it 
tantamount to transferring land from one company to another.xliv   
 
 
Logging Company Realignment 
 
 The moratorium period also brought a drastic reduction in the number of companies 
permitted to log in the DRC.  Only 18 of the 76 companies holding concessions before 2002 
were allowed to keep their titles, many being cancelled through the IMC review or merely 
phased out through concession realignment during the moratorium.xlv  This put the entirety 
of the country’s logging into the hands of only a few companies, the majority of which are 
owned by the Lichtenstein Listed Nord-Sud Timber (NST) group.xlvi  The largest of the NST 
four is SODEFOR, a French company that inherited the concessions of FORESCOM when 
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it was privatized in 2004.  SODEFOR went from owning 10 percent of all concessions to 
owning 25 percent, and the NST group as a whole went from owning 24 percent to 57 
percent.xlvii  SIFORCO, the second largest company, had all nine of its large-scale 
concessions converted into 25-year titles.xlviii  Through this “forest title conversion 
process”xlix the future of the DRC’s rainforest went from being spread across a mix of 72 
variously sized companies to being almost monopolized by five large companies.  This is 
dangerous for a number of reasons; the NST group’s near monopoly gives company leaders 
strong leverage in ignoring government requests.  The South African Institute of 
International Affairs (SAIIA), however, foresees this concentration as helping the DRC 
government to have both a firmer hold and clearer understanding of companies’ conduct.  
 This involves the new democratic government’s adherence to its much-lauded 
intentions of balancing policy between extraction, conservation and community 
development.  The SAIIA itself admits that government policy focus is often “skewed in 
favor of industrial logging… viewing the forest primarily through the fiscal lens of revenue 
needs”.l  Though some revenue accrual through exploitation of the forest is useful for 
community development and for quelling resurgences of war, policy bias towards 
unsustainable industrial logging will inevitably lead to logging far beyond expected levels.  
GIS mapping indicates that the land covered by current concessions is actually 2.9million 
greater than what concessionaires claim it to be.  This suggests that policy should 
overcompensate in terms of community protection and development focus in order to offset 
natural bias towards industrial logging. 
The SAIIA has particularly high hopes for improvement of “Cahiers de Charges”, 
contracts between concessionaires and local communities that both establish good working 
practices on the part of loggers, and organize terms of compensation for the logging of 
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community land.  In the past the Cahiers de Changes – nicknamed “Contracts of Shame” – 
involved vast plots of land being traded for miniscule compensation, often due to 
indigenous communities having little comprehension of the land’s economic value. For 
instance, SODEFOR compensated one community with coffee, sugar and cans of soup 
valued at US$100 for complete rights to log their land.li  The SAIIA hopes that the reduction 
in the number of companies holding concessions will result in stricter adherence to the 
intended purpose of the Cahiers, that being establishment of an equitable compensation and 
working relationship between title holders and communities indigenous to areas to be 
logged.  Yet the new democratic DRC government still has not formalized the Cahiers, and 
A.J.M ter Heegde notes that DRC companies are often unable to discuss contracts directly 
with community leaders, conversing instead with officials who are “former armed militia” in 
negotiations that are “often interrupted by petty corruption practices that are a common 
occurrence in DRC”.lii 
 
 
Causes of Deforestation in the DRC 
 
Causes of deforestation in the DRC may be typified as direct and indirect.  Direct 
causes include family farming and firewood collection in urban zones, commercial logging 
and road infrastructures in dense forest areas, and informal logging in easily accessible forest 
areas.liii  Across the DRC, the extent to which these factors affect deforestation varies greatly 
in accordance with geographic and demographic deviations.  For instance, areas such as 
Kananga, Kisangani, Kinshasa and Lubumbashi have far higher population densities than 
their surrounding areas, and are therefore more prone to issues of intense family farming and 
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firewood collection than issues of commercial logging.liv  As firewood and charcoal provide 
80 percent of the DRC’s energy needs, harvesting of trees for these uses becomes 
increasingly problematic as population density rises, as is happening in these areas.lv   
This informal logging also exhibits indirect impacts.  A report by the Forest Monitor 
estimates that 8,000 small-scale logging companies, known as “pitsawyers”, are currently 
operating in the DRC.  These are regarded as “informal” because they have no formal 
government contracts.lvi  These companies range from a small handful of local individuals 
meeting to log for two to three months of the year, to longstanding companies with an 
average of twelve permanent employees.lvii  A 2010 report by the DRC Ministry of 
Environment, Conservation of Nature and Tourism (MECNT) states that informal logging 
is the principal source of the DRC’s national timber market.lviii  This mainly consists of 
carpentry in urban areas, but also supplies many cross-border markets with Angola, Rwanda, 
Burundi, Zambia, and Sudan.lix  The extent of this informal harvesting is not as worrisome as 
its commercial counterpart in terms of scale, but the areas in which informal logging takes 
place are mostly located in forest areas that are protected or have specific agricultural 
potential.lx  Furthermore, as these practices are informal and therefore not established by 
government agreement, it is difficult for the government to record logging levels and 
activities.  A 2003 estimation suggests that levels are five to eight times the production levels 
of the informal sector, in terms of wood extracted.lxi 
Further problems lie in the manner in which logging will take place, and how its 
benefits are distributed.  The forests of the DRC are home to many communities of 
indigenous peoples, who have lived in the areas for innumerable generations.  Yet these 
customary rights do not translate into formal rights, and the voices of these groups bear little 
weight in decisions regarding granting of concessions.  Within the DRC’s indigenous 
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population of 68,692,600 there are 200 ethnic groups, which may be divided into four large 
tribes – the Mongo, Luba, Kongi, and the Mangbetu-Azande.lxii  The first three tribes are 
Bantu, and the Mangbetu-Azande is Hamitic.  The three Bantu tribes comprise the majority 
of the indigenous population, and these four groups in total constitute 45 percent of the 
DRC’s overall population.lxiii  The remainder of the population is comprised of migrants and 
war refugees from neighboring countries.   
Many of these indigenous communities practice swidden agriculture.   This process 
necessitates cutting and burning small patches of forestland for agriculture to be used for a 
season and then left to grow fallow, in a cyclical pattern.  For generations this form of 
subsistence has been practiced and has placed little burden on the land, yet is often 
scapegoated as a major cause of deforestation.  Ironically gaining some truth now that 
normal areas of circulation have been set aside for commercial logging or as protected areas.  
The banning of indigenous groups from these areas reduces the breadth of the cyclical 
pattern, thus forcing them to move in tighter patterns and leave the soil fallow for shorter 
periods.  This prevents the soil from fully regenerating, causing soil depletion and, thus, 
deforestation.   
These areas also serve as hunting grounds for bushmeat, the main source of protein 
for the vast majority of these communities.  Policing forests in remote areas is also often 
problematic, for “in remote protected areas, the effectiveness of a centralized management 
authority… is compromised”.lxiv  Policing protected areas of such magnitude is nearly 
impossible, stressing the need for an approach that does not rely on alienating forest 
communities from protected land and that provides incentives for healthy human-forest 
relationships.  Restricting indigenous groups that have had open access to areas for 
innumerable generations also holds normative issues.  There are moral and ethical 
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implications in illegalizing modes of subsistence on which these people depend.  
Furthermore, criminalization of these types of behaviors often fosters corruption and 
lawlessness, as they are necessary for survival.  The groups have no choice but to continue 
accessing the areas the rely upon for subsistence.  Preventing indigenous communities from 
continuing their traditional practices may therefore result in continuation of the practices, 
merely in a way that is environmentally harmful and more detrimental to their wellbeing. 
The logging concessions that ban these communities from their customary lands 
often take profits overseas, distributing little to the DRC government or to the land’s 
indigenous communities.  This is the case with Sodefor, a French based company and one of 
the largest operating in the DRC.  A 2002 World Bank initiative required distribution of a 
certain percent of income to indigenous groups, but since the intended 2002 
implementation, none has been distributed.  This lack of recognition of indigenous rights has 
led to social protests that breed further violence; sit-ins against SODEFOR’s practices in the 
Bandudu Province led to the physical beating and confinement of 27 villagers.  Reliance on 
underpaid, local men to police forest areas exacerbates these issues, and must be addressed.  
Ignoring customary rights and human rights of these groups necessitates immediate 
attention.   
 
 
3. Toolkit of Policy Approaches 
 
REDD 
 Current discussion of REDD as a solution to deforestation recognizes the 
environmental and human benefits of standing forests.lxv  The REDD initiative has been 
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adopted as the UNFCCC’s primary means of fighting climate change through reduced 
deforestation.  REDD involves development of schemes for payments to be made as 
monetary incentives for developing countries to reduce deforestation rates, with payment 
rates set in relevance to reduction rates in comparison to previous deforestation levels.lxvi  
This Payment for Environmental Services (PES) scheme is three-tiered.  At the international 
level, service buyers make payments to service providers; international donors make 
payments to national governments for deforestation reduction, or for actions that will result 
in deforestation reduction, such as policy reforms and enforcement.lxvii  The national 
government then pays subnational governments to implement deforestation-reducing 
policies and actions at the ground level.  REDD is a concept, rather than a ubiquitous set of 
actions, and the specific way in which it is implemented may therefore be tailored to fit the 
needs of each country. 
The incentive-based scheme rewards countries monetarily for voluntarily decreasing 
their deforestation rates below a “baseline” level that is calculated against previous 
deforestation rates.  Yet the calculation of a baseline amount is a contentious issue, 
particularly for the DRC, whose government officials have expressed concern that hitherto 
low rates of deforestation compared to other tropical forest nations, such as Brazil, will 
cause them to “lose out” in terms of compensation rates.lxviii  Linked to this is the concept of 
additionality, as payments should not be equal for protecting ‘low-risk’ areas that were 
unlikely to be deforested anyway.lxix  A report on the present UNFCCC implementation 
scheme notes that the current policy mechanism  
“sets a perverse incentive for countries to continue deforestation at only a slightly  
reduced rate [due to] the necessity to match implementation costs with the flow of 
positive incentives from REDD”.lxx  
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As the REDD scheme is set to credit emissions reductions, countries have incentives to set 
the deforestation rate just below the previous rate, in order to extend the length of time for 
which they may reduce rates and receive payments.  Therefore, overall payments are limited 
by a country’s past or initial emissions level, and countries may opt to receive payments 
immediately, or over time.lxxi   
Problems arise in the long-term feasibility of this scheme, as it creates incentives to 
utilize the cheapest and easiest methods of rate reduction first.  In trying to reduce 
deforestation rates, countries will immediately make use of the methods that are cheapest, 
easiest, and have the least opportunity costs.  This means that as time passes, it will become 
more difficult and expensive for countries to curb deforestation, and larger sacrifices will 
have to be made in order to do so.  The success of REDD will therefore decrease over time, 
and it could eventually become more economically beneficial for some countries to do away 
with REDD and begin deforestation practices once again.   
 Further problems of REDD ‘leakage’ have also been cited.  REDD can be 
implemented through two different approaches, the “national mechanism” and the “project-
based mechanism”.  The project-based mechanism, which implements the scheme in specific 
focal areas, can lead to leakage.lxxii  Leakage involves deforestation being successfully slowed 
or stopped in an REDD focal area, only to have it taken up in another.  Leakage, then, 
involves a “shift in human pressures from the project areas to other areas”,lxxiii which 
ultimately prevents changes in overall deforestation rates despite apparent REDD success.  
The national approach, which implements a top-down structure with a national central 
authority overseeing the countries REDD implementation as a whole, is therefore touted as 
preferable.  However, it too has issues of deforestation “displacement” involving similar 
deforestation location shifts, this time to neighboring countries.lxxiv  The UNFCCC has 
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therefore suggested designing rules to encourage wide participation and foster a common 
liability of global scale.lxxv  This initiative would likely take the form of a global baseline for 
deforestation rates, or a threshold rule that would calculate thresholds based on total 
emissions and the number of participating countries.lxxvi  Initiating a national REDD scheme 
in the DRC would therefore ensure readiness for this type of global initiative. 
 
REDD in the DRC 
 
If the DRC implements REDD as the primary mode of tackling deforestation, it will 
be paid monetarily to maintain deforestation rates below a baseline level calculated against 
previous annual levels.  This seems to be a primary policy option; in March 2010 the DRC’s 
Ministry of Environment, Conservation of Nature and Tourism released A Readiness Plan for 
REDD, which set guidelines to prepare the DRC for REDD implementation.  The proposal 
aims to ready the DRC by January 2013, with “ready” meaning fulfillment of a three-
pronged set of requirements.  First, the DRC must have a complete and specific national 
strategy for 2013 to 2030, including a detailed national budget with provisions for the 
scheme, as well as a “directly operational” plan of action.lxxvii  This plan of action must also 
include a business plan for the years 2013 to 2020, though the overall plan will carry through 
until 2030.  The second requirement contains national and local level stipulations.  At the 
national level, the Ministry demands, “legal, regulatory, institutional, organizational and 
financial framework must be adapted, established and complete”.lxxviii  At the local level, 
“coordination and guiding structures” are required, and a local-level trial program is 
suggested, to serve as an indicator of potential national success.lxxix  Finally, areas will be 
chosen according to their financial and resource feasibility for a “blazing launch” of the 
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REDD program, with a results-based approach.lxxx  The plan estimates US$22million will be 
needed for national level implementation, of which it intends to receive US$3.4million from 
the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility and US$5.5million from the United Nations’ REDD 
program.lxxxi  A somewhat detailed outline provided in the proposal is as follows: 
 
THE DRC REDD READINESS PLAN 2010-2012 
Global cost of the readiness plan: $22,652  
- Total available finance $1,827  
- of which UN-REDD/FCPF in progress $1,227  
- of which ITTO / REDDES $600  
Global costs to be covered: $20,825  
 
Financial support requested from UN-REDD and FCPF $8,900  
- request to World Bank / FCPF $3 400  
- Request to UN-REDD $5 500  
- of which UNDP $2 185  
- of which FAO $2 343  
- of which UNEP $972  
Co-financing* $11 925  
* Actions are under way in order to receive the financial support from CBFF and other bilateral donors. 
 
 A November 2009 decree established structures to oversee coordination and 
implementation of the plan, namely a national committee, interministerial committee and 
national coordination.  Though each of these structures operates at the national level, the 
decree calls for province representatives to be selected by 2012.  The proposal makes lofty 
promises regarding a system designed to monitor social and environmental impacts, which it 
deems “an essential guarantee to eliminate or reduce prejudice, duly compensate for the 
inevitable negative consequences on people and the environment, and to improve the 
Brittany Taylor 
 19
positive impacts and quality of expected results.”lxxxii  However, the report lacks specific 
clarification as to exactly how this monitoring system will be structured or implemented, and 
such high goals regarding such a notoriously difficult area of management are therefore 
dubious without specific plans for execution.  Though the 2006 Constitution delineated 26 
distinct provinces, the proposal will begin by implementing Provincial Institutional 
Structures according to the former division of 11 provinces, establishing “focal points” in 
each province, each with a head representative and a working team of ten government and 
non-government individuals.lxxxiii  The plan intends for three focal points to be established in 
2010, three in 2011 and the final five in 2012.lxxxiv   
 However, many indigenous rights groups still harbor concerns regarding involvement 
of indigenous groups in REDD conversations, which have thus far been carried out a higher 
governmental levels with little information being provided to or gleaned from local levels.  
Shirika la Bambuti, an NGO working to voice the opinions and rights of underrepresented 
indigenous groups, notes possible problems with the proposed scheme in terms of 
distribution of monetary benefits to indigenous communities, as well as recognition of their 
rights in forming policies.  The group points to a distinct lack of information available to 
these communities “despite the fact that REDD discussions are moving rapidly ahead”, and 
fears that current REDD schemes are structured in such a way that they will lead to the 
exclusion of groups from forest areas. lxxxv  The proposed schemes include “integral 
protection zones” that will strictly protects certain forest areas, yet banning indigenous 
groups from areas in this way will lead to the milieu of problems already seen in the instance 
of many national parks.  The group also draws attention specifically to the absence of legal 
provisions guaranteeing protection of indigenous rights, as well as lack of any reference to 
the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, exclusions which they believe will 
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allow the REDD scheme to be carried out without proper treatment of indigenous 
groups.lxxxvi  This therefore may not be the best means of moving forward, and balancing this 
choice with other methods of curbing deforestation might be wise.  One of the social 
criticisms of the REDD scheme, for example, is that it ignores the wellbeing of forest 
dwelling communities, and balancing top-down schemes such as REDD with more 
community-inclusive mechanisms is necessary. 
 
National Parks 
 
 An alternative policy option is protection of forest resources through establishment of 
national forest parks and reserves.  This method usually involves designation of protected 
areas that restrict human access.  The DRC has 18 established parks and reserves, nine of 
which are national parks.lxxxvii  The main purpose of the majority of the parks is the 
preservation of the bonobo chimpanzee, which is found wild only in the DRC.  Another 
goal is the preservation of endemic plant and animal species, many of which are also found 
only in the forests of the DRC.  However, little literature pertains to the human groups 
residing in the protected areas, and how issues of accessibility are addressed once the forest 
areas become protected. A study published by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations (FAO) notes,  
 In the Democratic Republic of Congo, protected areas have been created and  
administered without the participation of the population. This situation generated an 
atmosphere of mistrust on the part of the communities towards protected areas which 
they consider to be the business of the State. This position led to sabotage, poaching 
and degradation of these areas due to agricultural activities.lxxxviii 
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Such great attention to preservation of plant and animal species, and forest resources as a 
whole, is both necessary and commendable.  However there are normative issues in seeking 
such ends at the expense of human populations residing in areas designated for protection.  
CIFOR highlighted this problem in a recent report, noting two prevalent and increasingly 
observed problems being rural poverty in these forest areas, and the continuing degradation 
of unique forest ecosystems.lxxxix  To respond to these issues, CIFOR declares the need for 
a workable mix of conservation and development at large spatial scales… to enhance 
the production systems and expand the diversity of livelihood options available to 
poor people in forest landscapes while maintaining environmental functions and 
conserving biodiversity.xc 
These two ends have often existed at odds with one and other, but an equilibrium between 
forest conservation and human development in the DRC may be achieved if a balance 
between conservation policy and attention to human rights is found. 
 In National Parks and Poverty Risks: Is Population Resettlement the Solution? Michael Cernea 
and Kai Schmidt-Soltau assess implementation of national parks as a method of 
environmental conservation across Central Africa.  The study examines how development of 
restricted areas affects the communities residing there.  In all twenty cases studied, the 
groups living in the areas were expelled, and in the vast majority of cases no compensation 
was given.xci  The study examines the expulsion through the lens of the Impoverished Risks 
and Reconstruction Model, which was initially used by the World Bank to analyze the effects 
of involuntary displacement.xcii   Cernea and Schmidt-Soltau note that not one of the 
protected areas they examined created an official strategy to integrate local inhabitants into 
park management initiatives.xciii  This provides insight into why national park implementation 
can be so problematic.  By failing to incorporate local inhabitants, policymakers not only are 
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more likely to cause social and economic harm through poorly-facilitated resettlement, but 
lose out on the invaluable information that these communities have regarding the areas.  
 
 
 
History of National Park Implementation in DRC – The Twa 
 
 The establishment of national parks and reserves is a viable policy option in the DRC 
if these issues of displacement and community rights are properly addressed.  Forest-
dwelling communities inhabit much of the protected areas created in the DRC, and two of 
the national parks located in the Eastern DRC forests – the Kahuzi-Biega and the Virunga 
National Parks – are home to the Twa group.xciv  The Twa are often referred to as a “pygmy” 
tribe, and rely on hunting and gathering from forest resources as their main mode of 
subsistence.xcv  In Heading Towards Extinction: The Case of the Twa, Albert Kwokwo Barume 
details the effects of National Park designation on the livelihood of the Twa.  During the 
mid-1960s the DRC Government began an effort to expel the Twa from the Kahuzi-Biega 
National Park, and more than 6,000 Twa members were forced to leave forest areas they had 
inhabited “since time immemorial”.xcvi  They were provided no provisions for finding new 
territory on which to live.  This is troubling, in part, because of the removal of individuals 
from land to which they had historic attachment.  Many of the Twa’s religious practices 
relied directly on resources found in their traditional land, and on areas of the land itself.xcvii  
This is especially true for male Twa members, for whom the passage into adulthood involves 
rituals involving specific areas of land, which is sacred to the Twa.xcviii  Barume notes that the 
Twa “consider themselves to be part of the forest, perceiving it to be plentiful and 
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benevolent, a source of security and of life itself”.xcix  Though he may be being overly 
sentimental, Barume touches upon an important point.  It is ethically problematic for policy 
to expel groups from lands on which they depend, with no provisions for relocation, for the 
sake of environmental conservation.  Recognition of customary rights is at issue here, as 
there should be some acknowledgment of the Twa’s rights to the land. 
 There are also issues of economic and livelihood impacts.  The Twa had more than a 
sentimental attachment to their traditional land; they relied upon resources specific to that 
area, both for trade and survival.  In having to leave the Kahuzi-Biega Park area the Twa lost 
access to meat, honey, and wild tubers that they had exchanged with other non-Twa hunter-
gatherer groups in surrounding areas.c  The Twa traditionally relied on these relationships of 
exchange for salt, iron and metal goods, and numerous agricultural products.  Removing the 
group from their traditional lands therefore cut off these trade ties both by preventing 
physical meeting with non-Twa groups, and by cutting off Twa access to the goods they had 
traditionally traded.  This is a huge impediment to subsistence and survival, as is the removal 
of access to sacred religious areas. 
 The establishment of National Parks is a traditional conservation method, especially in 
issues of forest and forest resource conservation.  Workers of the Congolese for Nature and 
Conservation Institute carried out the expulsion of the Twa, aided by soldiers.ci  The 
Institute for Nature Conservation also installed “officiers de police judiciare” to oversee the 
protected areas, and gave them the power to “arrest and detain” anyone seeming to breach 
conservation laws.cii  These laws prohibit all non-government officials from entering the 
parks, whether for hunting, habitation, or any other reason.  Placing implementation of the 
policy in the hands of the Institute for Nature Conservation indicates that one motive of 
park policy is environmental conservation.  By establishing protected areas, the government 
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hopes to prevent deforestation and resource depletion of these areas.  In this sense, the 
policy and its motives are well founded.  However, failing to recognize the customary rights 
of groups indigenous to these areas is as problematic as resource depletion itself.   
 In terms of national park implementation, complete displacement of traditional 
inhabitants from newly protected areas should not be an option.  Though these groups 
impact the land and its resources, they have done so for generations, and the notion that it is 
forest-dwelling communities causing deforestation is misleading and often used as a 
distracting scapegoat from real causes of deforestation.  Furthermore, mere monetary 
compensation (which is rarely offered) does not suffice, and is extremely difficult to 
implement realistically.  Cernea and Schmidt-Soltau cite the example of compensation of the 
BaAka pygmies in the Dzanga-Ndoki National Park, which attempted to compensate them 
“for their income losses (losses in hunting and gathering for subsistence and loss of land), 
through alternative income generating activities, such as farming, livestock breeding, [and] 
eco-tourism”, yet the plan was “well outlined in theory… but not translated in practice”.ciii  A 
preferable alternative to displacing communities and attempting to compensate then, then, 
may be to involve them in conservation in the first place. 
 
 
National Parks and Communities 
 
 The establishment of national parks is a popular and often successful conservation 
method.  Problems arise in failing to address right of local communities, and cooperating 
with local communities when establishing protected areas may help solve these issues.  This 
method of community-integrated conservation has been attempted in the Tanya Nature 
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Reserve, located in the DRC’s Lubero Territory of North Kivu.civ  Within the area, local 
communities agreed to allot 850 square kilometers of land to the reserve.cv  This allotment 
was negotiated between local customary chiefs, and “local leaders and the intelligentsia”.cvi  A 
main aim of the park’s establishment was protection of animal species, as is the case with 
many DRC protected areas, yet terms were drawn up by which the local communities could 
continue traditional subsistence practices.  For example, “small mammals” are excluded 
from hunting restrictions, and hunting for food is allowed within regulations set by 
customary law.cvii A list of protected species ineligible for hunting was drawn up, and 
“integral zones”, where animals reproduced and inhabited in very high populations, were 
designated as no-trespass areas.cviii  Each of these allocations and conditions were created 
through dialogue between community representatives and governmental authorities, 
ensuring that both sides of the debate were heard. Banning all hunting on the protected 
lands would have been detrimental to local communities and could have harmed 
environmental resources by causing anger-fuelled overexploitation, as previously noted by 
the World Bank. 
 The Tanya Nature Reserve therefore established a balance between nature 
conservation and local community needs.  This balance is partly attributable to the emphasis 
placed on community-governmental discussion.  Dialogue committees comprised of local 
representatives were established in order to accurately represent popular opinion, and to 
create and prioritize lists of local needs.cix  These committees also taught “mesology” – a 
study of ecology and the relationships of organisms and their effects on environments - to 
help encourage locals to “remain friends of nature”.cx  But the Tanya Reserve experiment 
aimed to go beyond mere discussion, and attempted to promote economic development by 
striving to hire individuals from local communities.  More than 90 percent of the forest 
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trackers hired by the park were local sons of chief landowners.cxi  The study noted that hiring 
individuals familiar with the area was advantageous in two ways; the employees help to 
conserve the forest with which they are well acquainted and are able to monitor poachers 
with familiar ease, and the practice fosters an understanding of the benefits of conservation 
to the local community.cxii   
 The project developed local primary and secondary schools, health centers, 
orphanages, and provided technical and material support to local development initiatives.  
Furthermore, funding from Diane Fossey Gorilla Fun International and Conservation 
International provided scholarships to help local youth attend the University for the 
Conservation of Nature in Kasugho.cxiii  The FAO study noted that, ten years after its initial 
creation, the Tanya Nature Reserve was operating successfully.  It attributes this long-term 
success to “sustained dialogue between stakeholders (populations and TNR managers) and 
the transparent management of the benefits of the project”.cxiv  The Union of Associations 
for Gorilla Conservation and Community Development in Eastern DRC noted that an 
“awareness of the danger of losing the whole forest was born in the region”.cxv  This 
awareness prompted consultations between landowners and families, “with the aim of 
participating in the conservation of their own ecosystems to ward off the danger of 
extinction of faunal and floral species in their forests.”cxvi 
 
 
Beyond National Parks – Community Based Conservation 
 
 Community based conservation is sociologically beneficial in that it prevents 
community displacement and allows indigenous groups to continue traditional methods of 
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subsistence without sacrificing conservation.  Conservation attempts are aided as the 
intimate familiarity indigenous communities have with the land and its specific ecosystems 
may be utilized.  This familiarity may also breed innovative conservation ideas.  Moreover, 
involving local communities in the preservation of their traditional homelands increases their 
incentive to conserve. In Coping with the Tragedies of the Commons, Elinor Ostrom outlines the 
benefits of placing resource control in the hands of local communities, rather than an 
outside central authority.cxvii  Local knowledge has been developed over time, and local 
people may therefore be more attune both to the operation of the biophysical system and its 
fluctuations over time.  They are therefore more able to develop rules and regulations 
appropriate for the land’s individual population and resources.  Furthermore, placing the 
costs and consequences of enforcement in the hands of the people creates strong incentives 
to develop rules that decrease the chances of non-compliance, and increases cooperation and 
reciprocity.  Attempts by central governments to police park boundaries by hiring outsiders 
to physically protect borders is a common strategy, yet often fails because of the costs and 
impracticalities of patrolling such a large area.  The social complications of outsiders entering 
and exerting violent and forceful control over existent local communities can be equally 
pernicious.  Policing protected areas by this method is both infeasible and ethically 
problematic,cxviii and enforcement in the hands of the local communities may therefore be a 
vital step in successful conservation of protected areas.  A method of forest protection that 
includes and involves forest dependent peoples is therefore preferable, and the 
differentiation between an approach of this nature and the traditional approach of pure 
protectionism is characterized by Allard Blom as “conservation for the people” versus 
“conservation by the people”.cxix   
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But while the latter places power in the hands of local communities, the decrease in 
opportunity for the DRC government to exploit forest resources in order to garner revenue 
that may be used for development cannot be overlooked.  Additionally, Blom says that 
believing completely community-run conservation will prevent overexploitation is “naïve”.cxx   
Humans inherently desire improvements in their standard of living, and “an increase in the 
standard of living clearly means an increase in the use of natural resources, which leads to 
over-exploitation”.cxxi  Ostrom also posits potential issues in entirely locally led conservation.  
Forest-dwelling communities are often unable to adapt quickly enough to the complexity of 
policies necessary in such widespread conservation efforts.  Additionally, she foresees issues 
of cooperation between rural communities and central governments, including 
discrimination, tyrannical subjugation by an undemocratic elite, and conflict among 
appropriators.cxxii  Small communities dwelling in isolated rural areas will likely be unaware of 
political activities outside of their immediate region, and lack access scientific information 
that could be extremely beneficial in conservation and exploitation productivity. 
A medium between the two extremes may therefore be most appropriate, which may 
take the form of Integrated Conservation Development Projects (ICDPs).  Rather than 
being conservation by or for the people, it is conservation with the people.cxxiii  Finding 
balance between local responsibility and higher-authority influence may provide the best 
solution to the issues of successful forest protection.  For instance, the knowledge of local 
peoples of the intricacies and fluctuation of the environment is as necessary for successful 
conservation as the access of greater outside authorities to scientific information and 
countrywide issues.   
 
Community Based Conservation – A Comparative Study 
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The implementation of the ICDP approach in the Sangha-River region, a forest-
covered area between the Cameroon, Congo Brazzaville, and the Central African Republic, 
may provide a useful comparison to the prospective success of ICDPs in the DRC in that 
they share somewhat similar resource attributes.  Though the tri-national Sangha project 
spans three countries, the resources of the area in question here are comparable to those in 
the DRC, and the economic and political strength and stability between the tri-national area 
and the DRC are similar enough to warrant comparative analysis.  Cameroon, for example, 
has also recently developed political stability and so the DRC may be in a similar position to 
implement the ICDP policy approach in a similar way.  The WWF-backed Dzanga-Sangha 
ICDP, for instance, helps protect both the 3159 km Dzanga-Sangha Dense Forest Special 
Reserve and the Dzanga-Ndoki National Park, consisting of the 495 km Dzanga and 726 km 
Ndoki regions.cxxiv  The goal of the project is to prevent over-logging of forestlands, while 
establishing “multiple-use areas” that provide “long-term hunting and gathering 
opportunities for local inhabitants”.cxxv   
The program allows for traditional exploitation practices such as hunting, agricultural 
production, and limited commercial logging in “buffer zones”, which retaining some 
opportunities for government seizure of logging rents and revenues.cxxvi  At the same time, 
local communities are involved through “programs for wildlife protection, tourism 
development, research, education, and rural development”.cxxvii Establishment of the 
Dzanga-Sangha parks allows for 90 percent of the tourism entrance fees to be disbursed 
across local communities, 40 percent of which goes towards funding “a community 
association for rural development activities”.cxxviii  Though Richard Carroll lists continued 
poaching and local attitudes as major obstacles to the success of the scheme, Blom claims it 
to have been “fairly successful” in creating positive local attitudes to the approach.cxxix  Long-
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term success of the project, coupled with continued dispersion of revenues to local 
communities, may eventually help to resolve these issues. 
As a newly democratic country still abundant in lush forest land with rich 
biodiversity and rare species, the DRC has ample opportunity for ecotourism development 
that can be practiced in a sustainable way and involve local communities.  Carroll notes the 
political instability of the Dzanga-Sangha region as one of the impediments to 
implementation of the project, but the DRC has increasing political stability.  This approach 
would have the added benefit of promoting an image of positive ecological conservation, 
increasing the incentives for NGOs and outside countries to invest in development of the 
DRC. 
It is vital to ensure proper inclusion of local community opinion in forming the 
projects’ structures.  A version of the ICDP approach known as a Community-based 
Conservation Project (CBC) attempts to do just this.  The CBC approach offers not only 
“economic incentives to conserve living resources”, but includes an “education component” 
that would aid local understanding of conservation practices while increasing suitability for 
employment in the conservation arena. cxxx    This may create opportunities for future 
involvement in political decision-making regarding the area, helping local voices be heard at 
a more centralized level.  Furthermore, knowledge may be considered a resource in itself, 
one that often “naturally dovetails into the strategies of providing education and making 
contributions to basic understanding”.cxxxi  This is specifically important in the DRC, as 
higher population levels may change how the ICDP project takes effect in comparison to its 
relative success in the Dzanga-Sangha project.  Ecotourism and local employment are an 
important part of the conservation effort, and community education is therefore a vital step 
in ensuring local opinion is heard at the policy formation level. 
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Non-Timber Forest Products 
 
 The marketing of non-timber forest products (NTFPs), the goods garnered from 
forests that are not timber and do not necessitate felling of trees, has experienced a recent 
spike in interest.  Historically, NTFPs have served more as a ‘buffer’ means of subsistence 
upon which poor communities rely in times of hardship, with small amounts of products 
being distributed or sold in local markets. cxxxii  An estimated 90 percent of forest remains 
during extraction of NTFPs, as compared to a 50 percent forest reduction from both 
ranching and logging.cxxxiii  NTFP extraction and sale also has the socioeconomic benefits of 
tending to employ local, often poor individuals, helping provide economic uplift to 
communities that often do not reap the economic rewards of commercial logging.  
Furthermore, NTFP extraction rights and access to lands for extraction can be mediated so 
that maintenance of an intact forest is a requirement for continued access, as outlined in 
Roderick P. Neumann’s Commercialization of Non-Timber Forest Products: Review and Analysis of 
Research.cxxxiv   
 The recent surge of interest in NTFPs, as well as the possibility of dependence upon 
NTFP extraction as a viable forestry alternative, exists hand-in-hand with the recent “Green 
Movement”.  Environmental awareness has entered the global marketplace, with numerous 
products and brands touting ecological sustainability as a marketing tool.  However, there are 
only a handful of cases in which a NTFP has been extracted to a level sufficient for mass-
market distribution.  One such case is Guayaki Yerba Mate Tea, which is grown and 
harvested by local communities in the forests of South America.   The product’s success 
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serves as an instance of blending of marketing, socioeconomic advancement, and forestry 
preservation.  Part of the company’s foundation is a dedication to environmental 
sustainability; the tea product is grown in native forests, and the company works in 
partnership with farmers to provide technical education and strongly encourage (one could 
say require) farmers to begin repopulating any felled local forest with native hardwood 
trees.cxxxv  Through what they call “market driven restoration”, the company’s founders build 
a direct relationship between the product’s market success and forest restoration.  The 
company claims to “sustainably harvest organic yerba mate from rainforest grown 
cultivations and reforestation projects, generating a renewable income stream which enables 
these communities to improve their lives and restore their lands,” that are primarily based in 
Argentina, Paraguay and Southern Brazil.cxxxvi   
Such ends are, of course, highly lauded in the product’s marketing and, all skepticism 
aside, this may have real positive benefits.  Requiring farming “partners” to repopulate areas 
and to grow and harvest in sustainable ways creates a direct correlation between product 
sold and forest protected.  Publicizing this within the product’s marketed image draws on a 
recently heightened consumer awareness of environmental sustainability, increasing the 
product’s allure and, thus, increasing acreage of South American forest protected and 
reforested – not to mention the local individuals aided with steady income from the 
company.  Furthermore, heightened awareness of the forest areas and their communities 
may provide increased protection in a more generalized way.  Ascher notes that “affection” 
may be considered a resource in itself, in that charismatic species and individuals may be 
used to “mobilize public sentiment”.cxxxvii  The romanticized way in which the product is 
marketed may help to spark public outrage should any later attempt to log “Guayaki” 
protected territory in the future.  
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However, a potential pitfall neglected by the product’s romanticized marketing is that 
the forests’ resources are essentially being utilized and marketed by an outside actor.  
Though the Guayaki company-to-farmer relationship is a “partnership” and income to local 
communities is being increased, the product’s international success is reminiscent of the 
parable of the little man and the big stone, which is applied to the environmental 
conservation context in Michael Dove’s A Revisionist View of Tropical Deforestation and 
Development.  The parable is based in the idiomatic expression of forest dwellers in Borneo, 
that “Whoever finds a big stone, he will eventually suffer”.cxxxviii The expression refers to a 
“little man” finding a large and precious stone that will eventually be sought out by “big 
men” because, Dove asserts, the little men lack the economic channels and market structures 
necessary for dealing with such valuable goods.  The stone becomes a source of dissonance 
within the local structure and eventually attracts attention of “big men” who carry out 
product extraction and offer the local a “nominal honorarium” befitting a “poor tribesman 
in a poor corner of the country”.cxxxix  The local problems are that they are politically weak, 
and harbor a resource “coveted by groups that are more powerful than they are”.cxl  Though 
the Guayaki products are certified Fair Trade and base much of their product placement in 
providing adequate wages to their farming partners, no literature can be found on the precise 
economic relationship, and it would be important to note whether the shares received by 
local farmers are congruent with the product’s widespread and highly profitable success.   
This issue dovetails into problems inherent in reliance on NTFPs as an economic 
stimulus and for forest conservation.  Terborgh, Dugelby and Salafsky assess the reality of 
relying on NTFP extraction as the main means of forest preservation.  The analysis looks to 
ecological dispersal and the temporal nature of forest products as sources of instability; 
economic reliance of small, local communities on such temporal resources as an income 
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basis would be hazardous.  This, of course, signifies issue in attempting to base a larger 
economy in NTFP extraction, as one would assume would be necessary if is to be a 
replacement of traditional commercial logging.  Furthermore, the authors suggest that forest 
product extraction may not be as sustainable as it is often made out to be; extraction of 
many products affects reproductive patterns, meaning that while many means of nut, seed 
and animal extraction are sustainable on a small scale, an increase to the magnitude necessary 
for wider economic dependence would likely prove unsustainable.cxli  This issue is 
exacerbated by the fact that unclear property rights existent in areas in which marketable 
forest products tend to be found create perverse incentives to overharvest products, creating 
patterns of harvesting that are unsustainable in the long run.cxlii  However, Terborgh, 
Dugelby and Salafsky note that, in areas where traditional societies establish localized rules 
of property rights and governance, “a managed system of common property can potentially 
provide incentives for conservation”.cxliii  Therefore, a top-down structure where “big men” 
attempt to harvest the resources unmarketable by the “little men” would create incentives 
for overexploitation, resulting in an unsustainable system; however, if product extraction and 
the garnered benefits were placed more in local hands, conservation incentives would take 
precedent. 
Successful marketing of NTFPs also necessitates well-established social and physical 
infrastructure, such as roads, transportation methods, “middle men”, and traders, in order to 
get the products from harvest to market.cxliv  The most notable impediment, however, is 
stable and widespread demand; Terborgh, Dugelby and Salafsky note that the existent of 
synthetic substitutes for many traditional NTFPs, and only products with low elasticity – a 
“unit free measurement of change in demand in relation to change in price” – will have a 
steady market, whereas products with high elasticity will suffer potentially devastating 
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fluctuations in demand.cxlv  Extremely relevant to the discussion is the differentiation 
between demand rooted in “ephemeral fads” versus those based in real, long-term needs;cxlvi 
it is possible that the Guayaki model is an example of the former, and that, despite the tea’s 
success, the product – and the farming partners that rely on its sale – could fall victim to an 
eventual loss of consumer interest.   
The overarching problem with NTFPs as a method of forestry conservation is that it 
is extremely difficult, if not wholly unrealistic, to harvest and sell products at the rate needed 
to offset the economic revenue that would be made from commercial logging.  Not only 
would areas with adequate NTFP resource abundance be few and far between, the temporal 
nature of the resource would create an unstable income, and product sale is overly reliant on 
consumer preferences.  Moreover, the heightened rate of extraction that would be necessary 
may actually be unsustainable; though there is a current romantic notion of local farmers 
harvesting naturally existent products in a way that does not damage forest mass and is in 
harmony with the environment, it is not in keeping with the rate of extraction that would be 
necessary for dependence on NTFP extraction as a primary conservation method.  This does 
not, however, discount the benefits of looking to NTFPs as an alternative means of forest 
use and economic gain.  Indeed, Terborgh, Dugelby and Salafsky conclude that NTFP 
extraction can be useful conservation method, though as one component in a broader 
spectrum of conservation policy. 
 
Forest Product Certification Systems 
 
 Utilization of forestry certification as a conservation method is two-tiered; adherence 
to production standards allows certain producers to obtain the certification mark, which 
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then attracts consumers aiming to purchase a sustainably created product.  Each tier presents 
its own difficulties.  Inherent problems exist in certification standards, both in their 
stringency and in their policing.  This market-based conservation approach also rests on the 
need for consumers to be environmentally minded in their purchase decisions.  Levels of 
adherence to production rules may waiver, as may the stringency of the rules themselves.  
The success of the entire method depends entirely on an environmentally conscious 
consumer base.  The most widely recognized certification system is managed by the Forest 
Stewardship Council (FSC), and it is the only certification system with wide geographic 
distribution.cxlvii  Currently, there are more than 500 FSC forestry operations in almost 80 
countries, covering approximately 100 million hectares of forest, which is equivalent to 
seven percent of global forest cover.cxlviii   
The FSC received support from an array of NGO groups, and attempts to produce high 
levels of transparency by, for example, publishing summaries of all audits of FSC-accredited 
companies.cxlix  The FSCs method is “performance based”, requiring producers to meet a 
minimum standard of production conduct before they can receive an FSC certification.cl  
The success and stringency of the FSC provides a comparative framework for the successful 
implementation of product certification as a means of forestry conservation.  The most basic 
requirements for an FSC certification include: 
- Completion of an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
- Management and maintenance of habitats of rare, threatened or endangered species 
- The use of genetically modified organisms is prohibited 
- “Careful Control” of exotic species 
- The “conversion of natural forests” is prohibited.cli 
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One of the most fundamental aspects of the FSC is the dedication to oversight of company 
proceedings.  The FSC undertake regular “audits” of their certified producers to ensure 
standards are met.clii  Furthermore, by partnering with numerous NGOs and political 
groups, ranging from the WWF and Greenpeace to the World Bank, the FSC creates an 
image of legitimacy by ensuring consumers that there is oversight from multiple actors.cliii   
The dedication to transparency and oversight are two of the fundamental characteristics 
making the FSC a successful certification mark.  This is important in principle as it helps 
ensure adherence to stated certification regulations, yet it extends to form the basis of the 
certification’s success, as consumer preference is more likely to be obtained if the system 
appears transparent and trustworthy.  The FSC may, then, be used as a framework for 
successful certification creation, and provide insight into moving forward with certifications 
for use in the DRC. 
A particular instance of FSC success is the “chain-of-custody” procedure, in which 
each exchange of timber product throughout the lines of production must be tracked in 
order to keep the FSC stamp.cliv  Doing so allows companies and consumers to see where the 
product came from and how it was produced, if they so please.  This also prevents the 
problem of products receiving the stamp at one point in the production line – say, at the 
harvesting stage, or at the finals byproduct creation stage – yet having traveled through a line 
of unsustainable practices along the way.   
 The FSC stringency and overall reliability serve as a springboard from which to 
assess other certification systems.  The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 
is another well-known certification system that began by standardizing nuts and bolts and 
has evolved to be recognized as a standardization mark for a variety of environmental 
products, including timber production.  ISO standards are widely recognized and hold a lot 
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of influence; the EU only allows ISO certified products to be imported into EU territories, 
and the General Agreement for Tariffs and Trade, now part of the World Trade 
Organization, has largely embraced ISO standards.clv  This endows the ISO with a great 
amount of leverage.  However, the ISO lacks the focus on audits and compliance which are 
so fundamental to the FSC’s success, and ISO certification standards focus on “whether 
management initiatives are consistent with progress, rather than whether performance 
improvements have actually occurred.”clvi  Therefore, ISO certification is based on “firms’ 
willingness to gear up for environmentally acceptable performance rather than the more 
ambitious requirement of demonstrating acceptable performance.”clvii This focus, 
characterized as “input evaluation” rather than “output evaluation”,clviii is easier to comply 
with than FSC standards, as it requires only an intention to operate in sustainable ways, rather 
than actual follow through.  The International NGO Network on ISO criticized this issue 
with specific reference to forestry, claiming that companies may opt to be certified under the 
ISO 14001 certification stipulations “in lieu of the more rigorous – and credible from an 
NGO perspective – Forest Stewardship Council certification.”clix 
 This issue is a two-sided coin.  Some companies may indeed opt out of the FSC’s 
more stringent requirements in favor of the input-orientated ISO certification, leading to less 
sustainably produced forest products as companies formally intend to follow sustainable 
practices, but may not actually do so.  On the other hand, the ISO may provide a second 
best level of sustainability certification for companies that are currently unable to abide by 
FSC standards.  Though the FSC is widely recognized as the most credible certification 
system, it has “been unable to obtain the large-scale participation of small-scale private forest 
owners” and has limited progress in developing countries, attributed to its “stringency in a 
context of less stringent competitors.”clx  In this sense, the ISO serves as a catch-net for 
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companies unwilling or unable to comply with FSC standards, many of which tend to be 
smaller companies in developing countries, and is thus a very relevant notion for introducing 
greater forestry certification in the DRC.   
There remains, however, an overarching problem in terms of the failure of forestry 
certification systems to be accessible to small logging companies in developing countries.  
The foundations of forestry certification assumed that initial compliance would be simpler in 
smaller companies, helping to provide create markets for burgeoning community forestry 
efforts.clxi  This belief was based in the assumption that low-impact, locally based companies 
would find certification compliance easier than larger companies with greater outputs and 
consequently greater environmental impacts.clxii  In reality, forestry certifications have been 
awarded to more large companies than small, and most of the certified companies are in the 
global north.clxiii Only 23 companies deemed “community forestry enterprises” are FSC 
certified,clxiv and the small-scale, community-based companies that have received certification 
have garnered “little benefit in the market” and face increasing pressure from globalization 
and a “consolidating forest industry”.clxv This bears influences on forestry options for the 
DRC, particularly if a realignment of current concession distribution is to be considered.  If a 
move to shift concessions from the hands of larger companies to community-based 
enterprises is intended, the ability to comply with FSC (or even ISO) standards, and what 
this means for competitiveness in the global marketplace, must be taken into account. 
 Van Kooten, Nelson and Vertinsky analyze the economic and social factors that 
compel companies within countries to certify, aiming to clarify the disparity between 
numbers of certified companies in developed and developing countries.  Forest certification 
systems are an instance of market-based conservation in that companies must be persuaded 
by market-based incentives to become certified, rather than being required to by 
Brittany Taylor 
 40
governmental control.  In order for a company to be compelled to certify the foreseeable 
premiums or the rewards of market access must be substantial enough to offset the costs of 
adhering to certification standards.clxvi  Therefore, companies must anticipate economic 
advantage to certification, whether from lowered production costs, wider market access (as 
seen in ISO certification being a requisite for EU imports), or greater marketability.  
Sustainable practices are sometimes economically beneficial in and of themselves because 
they reduce wasteage.  This range of factors must therefore be met for forestry certification 
to be successfully implemented in the DRC, and it would therefore be pertinent to 
understand why some countries, such as the DRC, have far fewer certified forestry 
companies than others.  The authors look to economic factors to explain the low rates of 
certified companies in developing countries as compared to those in developed.  Low gross 
domestic product (GDP) is associated with a low willingness to pay to protect the 
environment.clxvii  The environment therefore has a higher opportunity costs in developed 
countries than it does in developing; in developing countries, forests are often converted to 
alternative uses, such as cattle-ranching or agricultural production, or are simply logged 
quickly and unsustainably, because these uses have higher economic returns than forest 
preservation.clxviii   
But the authors extend their analysis beyond economic factors, looking to social 
institutions and their informal constraints as creators of rules of conduct.  Formal 
institutions, such as constitutions, laws and property rights, are differentiated from informal 
institutions, such as taboos, cultural customs, and norms of conduct.clxix They suggest that 
the stronger the social institutions, with their respective taboos and codes of conduct, the 
stronger the pressure to adhere to normative rules and, thus, to certify.clxx  In developed 
countries, social norms are generally more strongly held in regard to environmental 
Brittany Taylor 
 41
conservation, and there is, therefore, more pressure for companies to certify as sustainable.  
Of course, this is directly related to the aforementioned economic stimulant; in countries 
with higher GDPs greater emphasis is placed on conservation, therefore bringing an increase 
in social pressure for sustainable production.  Strong societal norms are also linked to good 
governance,clxxi with relevance to the DRC; as the country’s democratic institutions are quite 
new and generations have suffered long periods of political unrest, there is likely less of a 
widespread notion of social pressure for companies to behave sustainably, or to become 
certified. 
Strong social and legal institutions have similar bearing on levels of certification, as 
mature institutions are needed to support adherence claims of companies, while concurrently 
reassuring buyers of the validity of certified products and providing a means of recourse, 
through legal institutions, should the certification stipulations be breached.clxxii This 
emphasizes the importance of the latter stages of the certification system; certification labels 
become meaningless if consumers do not believe that standards are being adhered to, or if 
they do not have opportunity to take action if noncompliance occurs.  Similarly, strong 
social capital coaxes firms to certify by calling for environmental responsibility.  Therefore, 
while economic incentives are necessary to drive initial certification, social capital and strong 
institutions are needed to maintain certification standards and provide assurance to 
consumers throughout the process.  
 
 
4.  Projections for Policy Implementation in the DRC 
 
Policy Options: Moving Forward 
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The DRC’s history of political strife and the developing nature of its economy 
necessitate some revenue from resource exploitation.  Yet conservation of forest resources is 
necessary for the wellbeing of the global environment, and the predominance of forest-
dependent communities means that forest extraction as it is set to happen would displace or 
greatly hinder a large portion of the population.  Potential policies must therefore be 
evaluated with this balance in mind.  Though the conservation options of the DRC have 
thus far been laid out individually with seemingly definite distinctions between them, a 
hybridized policy structure that includes attributes of each of the options may prove the best 
means of moving forward.  Previous analysis of community-based conservation and its 
potentials in the DRC suggest that this would serve well as the main crux of the future of 
forestry policy.   
Ideally, the DRC government would cede land to local communities, who would take 
initial charge of conserving forest areas, with assistance and compliance with local 
governance.  Sustainable levels of resource exploitation would be calculated depending on 
the particularities of each area, and emphasis on NTFPs, ecotourism, or sustainable logging 
would be made specific to each area’s communities, resources, and levels of previous 
degradation.  Artisanal logging should be brought under control and formalized, and existing 
commercial concessions reevaluated (and, ideally, mostly annulled).  Improvement of logging 
mechanisms and formalization of artisanal logging would help prevent wasteage and increase 
timber prices, thus accruing higher revenue for less land logged.  Development of 
certification systems within the DRC would help develop access to international markets for 
exports of NTFPs and sustainably-harvested timber, which may be taxed, within reason, to 
accrue government revenues.  Payment for environmental services schemes through REDD 
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initiatives would allow some communities, particularly those in areas with previous 
degradation or areas of high conservation prospective, to emphasize conservation rather 
than exploitation.clxxiii  These areas may therefore be especially prime for ecotourism.   
A study by the Forest Monitor of the United Kingdom notes that two beneficial 
attributes of the DRC are that its population is heavily forest-dependent, and its forests are 
very large with varied resources.clxxiv  The size and variety allow different policy emphases to 
be implemented in different areas.  For example, one area may emphasize NTFPs, another 
ecotourism, and another artisanal logging.  Furthermore, the dependence of such a large 
population on DRC forests may be capitalized upon to strengthen the manpower behind, 
and favor towards, community-based conservation.clxxv  As so much of the current forest 
exploitation comes from local use – from artisanal logging, to charcoal production, to 
swidden agriculture – providing clear incentives to conserve would therefore bring about 
substantial change.  However, such an amalgamated policy vision must be broken down and 
each compartment assessed for the prospective realities of implementation within the DRC.   
 
Community Based Conservation in the DRC  
 
The lynchpin of such a forestry policy is the ceding of land to local communities, in a 
direct move toward community-based conservation.  In Self-Governance and Natural Resources, 
Elinor Ostrom outlines the different necessities for successful community-based 
conservation of forest resources.  She characterizes forests as common-pool resources, and 
their respective assets, such as watershed protection, carbon sequestration, and biodiversity, 
as externalities or public goods.clxxvi  Ostrom separates the factors behind successful 
community-based resource management into attributes of the resource and attributes of the 
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users.  The attributes of the resource are the feasibility of improvement, indicators and 
information regarding the condition of the resource, resource predictability, and the size or 
spatial extent of the area at question.  The DRC is a prime candidate within Ostrom’s 
attribute of feasibility of improvement, for she notes that forest users are more able and 
more likely to conserve in instances where a forest is beginning to deteriorate, but has not 
been decimated entirely.clxxvii  This is almost an exact description of the current state of the 
DRC’s forests, and is furthered by existent but thus far unfulfilled logging concessions, 
which may fuel the urge to conserve by illustrating the possibility of entire decimation. 
  The attribute of “indicators” or information regarding the resources is similarly 
existent, as the political shifts and the past concession granting in the DRC has brought 
much attention to the forest resources, spurring analyses by political scientists and research 
by international organizations such as CIFOR.  Indicators are also available at the local level, 
where communities subsist on forest resources and therefore have an intimate awareness of 
local areas.  The final two attributes necessitate that the availability of the resource be 
predictable and the spatial extent of the area be sufficiently small.  These assets would be 
best fulfilled by the careful disbursement of forest areas among communities.  The DRC 
forests are large and contain diverse biodiversity and a range of community groups, and 
ceding of land to specific community overseers must be done in such a manner as to ensure 
that areas to be overseen are not too large.  Communities that have lived in specific areas of 
the forest for many generations, and therefore have an intimate knowledge of the area, can 
help fulfill the predictability asset, as resource fluctuations will seem more “predictable” to 
them than it would to outsiders.  Ceding of areas should therefore be centered on 
legitimizing existent customary rights, rather than creating new boundaries.  This links to 
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Ostrom’s observation that most problems arise when rules of self-regulation that have been 
designed by local communities are overlooked and therefore trumped by policymakers.clxxviii  
 The attributes of users are the level to which users depend on the resource (salience), 
a common understanding of the resource, the users’ discount rate in terms of the resource’s 
future benefits, trust, autonomy in extraction decisions, and prior organizational 
experience.clxxix  The majority of these attributes necessitate prudent organization of political 
structures surrounding the community structures.  Ostrom points out that community-led 
conservation tends to be more successful when there is a balance between local leadership 
and higher oversight, and attributes, such as the autonomy in decision-making, depend upon 
the way in which power is decentralized.  Prior organizational experience in most areas will 
likely be high in terms of customary rules with in the community, but low in terms of 
interaction with more centralized political powers.  A smooth transition will therefore be 
dependent on apt structuring of community-authority relationships.  The salience of DRC 
communities is very high, as the majority of communities in question are historically forest-
dependent, and the discount rate for future benefits is accordingly low as long-term 
dependence on forest areas has fostered a high value on resource retention.  The strength of 
both these attributes provide great incentive for DRC communities to conserve; Ostrom 
notes that expected benefits must outweigh the high costs of organizing and maintaining a 
self-governed system,clxxx and the DRC’s fulfillment of these attributes is therefore very 
important. 
 Ostrom’s analysis provides eight design principles that she believes are fundamental 
to proper implementation of a community-based system.  Firstly, the boundaries of the 
common pool resource and elucidation of who has access rights must be clearly defined.clxxxi  
Within the DRC, this means a detailed delineation of rights to certain areas, which will likely 
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be complicated by aforementioned “native” citizenship issues founded by the long-term 
habitation of many communities and exacerbated by influxes of refugees and by the 
reassignment of citizenship laws under Mobutu.  Establishing who has rights to where will 
therefore necessitate dialogue between local communities and political leaders, to be carried 
out in ways that allow representatives from all communities to voice opinions without 
intimidation.  An example of this is found in the Bikoro Territory initiative, where the 
Committees for Dialogue and Vigilance (CDVs) established at the provincial level 
communicated needs through dialogue with local government, who in turn relayed 
information to higher government.  The group-structure of the CDVs avoided issues of 
single community representatives seeking individual profit and failing to properly address the 
needs of the community at large, which is sometimes the case when local governments 
address only village “chiefs”.clxxxii Ostrom’s principles of congruence in the appropriation of 
benefits and of collective-choice arrangements require a structuring that ensures participants 
receive benefits proportionate to the costs of complying with provisions, and that those 
affected by the rules of provisions have the chance to help shape them.clxxxiii  If individuals 
believe system costs to be greater than perceived benefits they will begin to “cheat”, and 
others, seeing them, will begin to cheat as well.clxxxiv  These principles are fundamental to 
successful community-based conservation, and should underlie the shaping of the 
decentralized leadership structure. 
 The latter of Ostrom’s principles regard monitoring of compliance and behavior, and 
a graduated increase in sanctions levied against offenders with local, low-cost resolution 
mechanisms.clxxxv  These may all be fulfilled through placing the responsibility of monitoring 
into local hands.  In Transforming Rural Hunters into Conservationists, Gibson and Marks analyze 
the effects of using economic incentives to encourage local conservation.  The analysis 
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focuses on game hunting in Zambia, but the overarching concepts remain the same.  In the 
case study, the scouts have the decision to enforce or not enforce law, and rural individuals 
have the choice to hunt small, medium or large game.clxxxvi  The Administrative Management 
Design for Game Management Areas intitiative provided monetary and job-retention 
incentives to scouts for patrolling effectively, and schooling and healthcare access as 
incentives to local peoples.clxxxvii  Yet the project did not have the desired conservation effect; 
schooling and healthcare was non-exclusatory and therefore a public good, and hunters 
utilized these resources while continuing to hunt.  Furthermore, the project overestimated 
the importance of monetary incentives and underestimated the importance of continued 
access to wildlife and hunting for the local peoples.  The framework assumed that valuation 
of monetary incentives of those inside the community would be the same as those outside, 
ignoring the importance of hunting to the local community, particularly in terms of 
developing social roles as men and as hunters.  Gibson and Marks note that even in cases 
where hunting of larger mammals was successful restricted, these projects were not 
financially self-supporting and required continuing high levels of support from outside 
donors.clxxxviii 
 More effective means of conservation would, then, come from creating 
accountability within the community.  Monitoring groups and protected areas from a central 
authority is notoriously problematic, as countries such as the DRC often lack the monetary 
resources and manpower to effectively patrol areas.  The hiring of local individuals with no 
personal interest in conserving the area opens the floodgates for bribery, hampering 
supervision and setting a precedent of illegal exploitation.  The analysis of Gibson and Marks 
illustrate the inherent problems in using economic incentives to induce proper monitoring, 
and development projects, which are essentially public goods, to invoke compliance.  For 
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proper compliance, then, the incentive must lay in conservation itself.  It is therefore 
preferable that those monitoring are accountable to the users, or are actually the users 
themselves.clxxxix  Hiring individuals who are from the community and therefore have a 
vested interest in conservation increases incentives for efficient monitoring and decreases 
incentives to accept bribes, while providing community employment.  Ostrom also notes 
that investing in monitoring in this way creates a public good.cxc 
 
Community Based Conservation – A DRC Case Study 
 
 An SAIIA Report of forestry policy in the DRC notes that while the state of 
conversion titles and the work of NGOs are widely publicized, little is known of happenings 
on the ground, or, rather, in the forest.cxci  The SAIIA focus on a specific case of community 
conservation implemented in the Bikoro territory of the Equateur Province, which lies on 
the shores of Lake Tumba and, due to its geographical location, “plays a key role in 
regulating the climate of Central Africa”.cxcii  It is home to approximately 128,000, and is 
therefore quite sparsely populated at 24 people per km2.   This population is comprised of a 
small Batwa pygmy population, and three Bantu ethnic groups; the Ngele Antando/Mongo, 
Ntomba, and Ekonda.cxciii  More than half of the population in the Bikoro territory is under 
20 years of age, and it is therefore a young population that subsists primarily on farming, 
fishing, and foraging for non-timber forest products.  A mere 15 percent of the adult 
population of the area is permanently employed, and those that are work mainly in education 
or local administration.cxciv  A report by the South African Institute of International Affairs 
(SAIIA) “These jobs are poorly paid and it is common practice for such people to 
supplement their incomes by living off the forest and lake…Anecdotal evidence is that 
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mosquito nets have been used for fishing. This practice tends to catch juvenile fish in an 
unsustainable manner.”cxcv  Equater is the poorest province the DRC, with 90 percent of the 
population living in absolute poverty, compared to a national average of 70 percent.cxcvi  
Community structure is centered on the Church.  For instance, many administrative 
representatives are priests and religious figures, and the local Catholic mission supports the 
school and hospital.cxcvii 
 The Bikoro territory specifically was selected as a case study as there have been 
relatively low levels of commercial logging in the area thus far, though there is a multi-
stakeholder forestry governance project in the area and logging concessions owned by three 
different companies.cxcviii   The territory’s forest is primarily older, secondary forests, 
regenerated from logging that began in the colonial period and finished no later than 
1975.cxcix  In 2007, a European Union-funded IUCN project was started in the area that 
served to assess the problems and successes of community-based forestry conservation in 
the DRC, as well as to provide “an opportunity to study relations among these actors 
participating in the project through observing the interaction of logging company staff, local 
community representatives, local administrators, NGOs and the church (representing civil 
society).”cc  The project focused on incorporating local voices into the administrative 
structure of the area, placing conservation more in the hands of the people.  The project is 
therefore aptly named “Strengthening Voices for Better Choices” (SVBC), and the EU 
funded project as a whole aims to “translate contemporary thinking on forest governance 
into practice”.cci  The SVBC has a “bottom-up tripartite structure” that includes village-level 
Committees for Dialogue and Vigilance (CDVs).  Bikoro has 32 CDVs across the territory, 
with each CDV having between 12 and 15 members.ccii  Of these 32 CDVs, 27 are “general”, 
and five are “niche” CDVs, focusing on: artisanal logging, charcoal production, poaching, 
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NTFPs, and corporate social responsibility contracts.cciii  Niche CDVs are set up when village 
members think topics are specifically relevant to their local area, in order to address the most 
locally pertinent issues.   
 At the territorial level, the SVBC created and supports the Consultative Council on 
forest Governance that oversees forest policy for the entire territory, serving as an 
intermediary between logging companies, local government, higher government and CDVs.  
The Consultative Council contains the “College Executive”, which is comprised of a 
representative from each of the stakeholder groups; an administration member, the private 
sector (currently represented by an ITB forest engineer) and civil society (currently 
represented by a local priest).cciv  At the provincial level, SVBC interacts with the Equateur 
Province’s Network for Good Forest Governance in order to “engage the different 
stakeholders in constructive dialogue”.ccv  At the national level, SVBC hosts a “national 
thematic forum for good forest governance”, aimed at combating illegal and unsustainable 
exploitation of forest resources, while furthering intra-level communication.ccvi   
 The study outlines the problems and detriments associated with the project in the 
short time since its foundation.  SVBC has facilitated greater dialogue between the multiple 
levels of forest stakeholders, and has improved the ability of local inhabitants and their 
representatives to access information.  Dialogue helped increase local input and break down 
negative stereotypes on both ends.ccvii  The structure has allowed representatives from local 
communities to have greater say in how forest management is carried out.  However, the 
SAIIA references local sentiment that higher levels in the SVBC favor the interests of 
logging companies, especially as SODEFOR was considering commissioning the IUCN to 
negotiate logging concessions.ccviii  Neutrality within the structure is, the SAIIA admits, 
imperative to proper functioning of the system, and these feelings of preferential treatment 
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may therefore be problematic for long-term cooperation.  Furthermore, logging company 
ITB is quoted as lauding benefits of the system, stating, “Thankfully we have the IUCN to 
talk to the people… before the forest owner (usually the customary chief) demanded 
whatever he wanted: a car, for example. Now the communities understand that cahiers de 
charges are restricted to things like tools, schools and hospitals.”ccix  It is indeed an 
improvement that logging companies and local communities may now converse and 
negotiate more easily.  SODEFOR, for instance, commissioned the IUCN to create focus 
groups that included youth, women and pygmies to negotiate the cahiers de charges, claiming 
they “hope this collaboration with the IUCN will improve our relations with the local 
communities”.ccx  However, ITB’s statement suggests that doing so may, thus far, be to the 
benefit of the logging companies.  This is problematic, and suggests that the SVBC structure 
may indeed be biased towards logging companies and higher-tier actors.  The same ITB 
representative explained that  
 the ITB is in partnership with the IUCN so that if there is a misunderstanding with  
local communities. Joël [Kiyulu] explains to them that we are not a substitute for the 
state…When our boat gets to the lake people want to load their goods onto it first. We 
don’t have the authority to stop them, since we are not the state. The IUCN can 
explain to the people that if they load first and there is no space left for the company’s 
logs, the ITB will go out of business and the boat will no longer help them with 
transport.ccxi 
Again, bias in favor of the logging companies needs and rights is apparent.  The IUCN 
structure is not intended to act solely as a translator for companies, but is meant to facilitate 
a dialogue between levels.  Weighting of support toward companies and higher-tier 
structures defeats the overall purpose of SVBC and community-inclusive conservation.   
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 Additionally, the SVBC and similar structures can only serve to increase local voices if 
structures are properly implemented to ensure all community voices are heard.  In Bikoro, 
much community interaction is conducted in association with the Church, as is the case in 
most of the DRC.ccxii  Involvement of the Church is therefore necessary in order to ensure 
sustained involvement of the community, yet does not necessarily represent the needs of all 
local peoples.  The SAIIA states, “While local-level tripartite structures could go some way 
in strengthening the voice of communities, as mentioned, in Bikoro very few organized local 
civil society organizations exist outside of the church. This was a specific challenge identified 
in the territory.”ccxiii  The SODEFOR-commissioned working groups that included women, 
youth and pygmies are a potential means of overcoming this problem, and creation of these 
types of groups as an SVBC standard is therefore desirable. 
 
ICDP: A Large Scale Reality? 
 
 The necessity for small, organized groups and a tripartite-local structure stems from 
the lack of ground-level political structure in Bikoro.  As cited, the bulk of civil society 
organization is rooted in the church and in religious structures.  While this functions on the 
small, ground level scale for the Bikoro territory trial program, it is questionable whether a 
similar scheme would work on a national scale, and whether this would be realistic or 
sufficient in curbing wider deforestation issues.  In the new political structure of the DRC, 
the implementation of a presidential democratic republic has taken the form of a bicameral 
legislature, divided between the National Assembly and the Senate.  The latter drafted the 
2006 constitution.ccxiv  President Kimbala heads a 37 member Cabinet of Ministers and was 
inaugurated December 6th 2006 to serve a five-year term.  Jean-Pierre Bemba serves as Vice 
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President.ccxv  Following the 2006 implementation of the new Constitution, the Prime 
Minister, appointed from within the Party holding the most seats within the National 
Assembly, is responsible for Parliament.ccxvi  However, the allocation of Party seats in the 
new legislature is problematic.  Following the 2006 distribution, 68 parties and 63 
independents won seats in the new legislature.ccxvii  Kabila’s PPRD party won 111 of 500 
seats, 22.2 percent, the largest allotment of seats by any one party.ccxviii  Bemba’s MLC came 
in second with 64 seats, only 12.8 percent.ccxix  No other party won over 10 percent of seats; 
54 parties won less than one percent representation, and 29 parties won just one seat.ccxx  
This is problematic as it necessitates a reliance on party coalition and alliance for successful 
governance in areas such as forestry policy.   
 In Can a Fledgling Democracy Take Place in the Democratic Republic of the Congo?, Mark 
Anstey suggests that, as the country is still in the process of forming new political structure, 
political actors will move away from behaviors detrimental to other parties and instead focus 
efforts toward what is best for the fledgling democracy, in an instance of “pacting”.ccxxi  This 
provides hope for the effectiveness of intra-party cooperation toward a common goal, at 
least in the short term. However, Anstey sees long term and more fundamental issues with 
the new governmental structure that, as it would foster weak government as a whole, would 
be problematic for implementation of sound forestry policy.  He views the structure of the 
DRC’s political system as “an effort to respond to its ethnic diversity (through an increased 
number of provinces) and mute secessionism (through retention of provincial revenues)”, 
and highlights the absence of a unified national identity, and the problems inherent within 
it.ccxxii  The lack of a strong national identity is an obstacle to sound national governance, 
particularly in a country with an extremely diverse population that has a history of 
conflict.ccxxiii  This is of particular relevance to the feasibility of actualizing an ICDP-type 
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community based conservation system, as implementation of such schemes across the nation 
would require a balance between overarching control and specific, on-the-ground creation of 
localized plans. The existence of extremely specialized SVBC groups in the Bikoro territory 
exemplifies this.  The groups were created for attention to specific problems, such as illegal 
charcoal production, which is cited as the most prevalent and harmful problem in the Bikoro 
territory.ccxxiv  This reinforces the value of involving of local communities, who best know 
the area’s specifics issues and attributes, and the concurrent issue of establishing such a 
nuanced and niched structure on a wider scale.  Though the Bikoro territory case 
successfully created specified SVBC groups that represented problems specific to the local 
area, the case had the advantage of specialized attention and oversight due to its 
experimental nature.  This level of attention may not be feasible on a countrywide level. 
Anstey speaks further on the problems of an absence of national identity for 
effective governance, noting that a lack unified identity “inhibits a broad-based consensus 
for state-building purposes and, coupled with poor infra-structure, limits the capacity of a 
central government to acquire revenues, offer services, and broadcast control effectively”.ccxxv  
“State weakness and lack of accountability”ccxxvi are cited as the prevalent obstacles facing 
implementation of the Bikoro problem, which are also issues for the DRC government in 
general.   
 
 
Community Based Conservation – Government Relationships 
 
 The question, then, is how much government control should be levied over the 
community groups, and how this relationship should be organized?  Government 
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intervention can be beneficial within community-based conservation, when levied in the 
right areas and not too heavy-handedly.  Though monitoring is best placed in local hands, 
dispute resolution may prove contentious if left to communities, and government refereeing 
in dispute management and in the upholding of area boundaries is necessary.ccxxvii  
Government intervention will be more necessary during early stages of community control, 
when organizational structures and hierarchal roles and relationships are still being 
established.  Though communities will have existent organizational structures, there will 
likely be shifts and requirements for new responsibilities, such as group coalitions and 
elections of representatives to interact with higher governments.  These will not be 
preexistent and government oversight during the transition period would therefore be 
beneficial.   
The same may be said for government financing, as cost-benefit analyses of new 
ventures, such as greater NTFPs extraction and marketing, or ecotourism, may indicate 
foreseeable financial revenue only after a period of losses.ccxxviii  The government may 
therefore provide financial support to infant industries in the early stages of development.  
Similarly, the government may use its centralized power to utilize revenues to support 
general poverty alleviation mechanisms.ccxxix  For instance, education and training programs 
for communities will enhance local livelihoods, while being mutually beneficial in creating 
next-generation political leaders who are educated yet have the benefits of understanding 
local nature and needs.ccxxx   
  
 
REDD – The Realities of Moving Forward 
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REDD schemes are promising, and involvement of the DRC in such global 
movements towards conservation will likely bring positive repute on the world stage.  
However, they will have high transaction costs, particularly in regards to monitoring and 
verification of compliance.  Furthermore, payments are performance based.ccxxxi  The scheme 
will therefore not provide any immediate source of revenue, and the REDD initiative must 
be coupled with other policy functions and means of income.  In 2008 the World Bank listed 
the DRC as one of 13 countries chosen for REDD funding through the Forest Carbon 
Partnership Facility, to provide financial and executive help in implementing REDD.ccxxxii  
However, the scheme at that time received much criticism for neglecting local communities 
in policy designing, and implementation of REDD within the context of DRC community-
based conservation may therefore be optimum.  The main criticisms of REDD, as outlined 
earlier, are a lack of attention to customary rights and community voices, problems of 
“leakage”, and issues of additionality.  In bringing the DRC into the REDD initiative these 
issues must be avoided, while ensuring initiative funding as well as proper disbursal of 
revenue. 
 A DRC Progress Sheet for February 2011 was released by the World Bank, outlining 
the financial and social readiness for REDD implementation.   A US$200,000 FCPF was 
fully disbursed, with another US$3.4million grant ready to be signed March 2011.ccxxxiii  The 
DRC’s National REDD Coordination is deemed “operational”, with over 15 active technical 
staff, and the National REDD Committee and Interministerial Committee met for the 
second time February 2011.ccxxxiv  With funding attributed, it is vital to address community 
involvement in REDD.  The current readiness status as set out by the World Bank notes 
that positive efforts have been made to provide information and REDD awareness to rural 
communities.  Province-level workshops were held to train journalists on REDD issues, and 
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radio and television “awareness raising” sketches have been distributed in French, Kiswahili, 
Kikongo, Tschiluba and Lingala.ccxxxv   
 These are positive movements towards a successful move to REDD in the DRC.  
While the emphasis on community involvement is applaudable, one of the main concerns 
with REDD is the “carving up” of forest lands, protecting (via limited local access) areas 
that policymakers fail to recognize as fundamental to the livelihood of forest-dependent 
communities.  Raising awareness through television and radio publications may, therefore, 
not go far enough.  In January 2011 a “Province Level Dynamics” process was initiated in 
the Maniema province, involving consultations regarding each of the endeavors taken by the 
National Coordination Committee.ccxxxvi  This type of intimate communication between 
policymakers and local communities is vital if REDD is to truly adopt local welfare in its 
planning.  The Maniema Province Level Dynamic consultations are a tangible example of 
sufficient communication, and is a structure that the National Coordination Committee 
should implement across the DRC, to create a successful REDD structure for its own sake, 
but also to avoid further criticism from human rights groups and to ensure continued 
funding from the World Bank.   
At this present stage the limitation of such structures to one province is 
understandable, as dialogue between local communities and higher authorities has been 
historically weak.  The proposed community-based conservation structure would, then, 
organize community structures and establish elected representatives, creating points of 
contact within communities for policymakers to address.  Furthermore, the conservation 
structure would help delineate conservation areas with limited access, and areas that 
communities would exploit, thus avoiding much-feared issues of REDD restricting access to 
lands vital to communities.  The REDD structure is one that could, feasibly, be implemented 
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independently, with no regard to forest-dependent communities.  However, doing so would 
rally further opposition from human rights groups, and would likely fail to come into 
compliance with World Bank notions of “readiness” and thus hinder further funding.  The 
REDD should, then, be implemented in cooperation with community-based conservation 
methods.   
 A report by the Woods Hole Research Center in the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change suggests dividing future income from REDD into 
Governance Funds, a Private Stewardship Fund, and a Public stewardship Fund.ccxxxvii  The 
Private Stewardship Fund would distribute funds to local, forest-dependent 
communities.ccxxxviii  If REDD is partnered with community-based conservation these funds 
may be used to finance CBV type groups and governance, as well as helping to improve the 
general standard of living.  As previously mentioned, community organization in the 
manners suggested, as well as means of contact with local government and access to 
information, have been historically low.  A Private Stewardship Fund may use a portion of 
REDD revenue to improve communication and finance community organization.  
Furthermore, the report suggests investing a portion of the Fund in intensifying agricultural 
production, effectively supporting communities on less land.ccxxxix  Investing in improved 
seeds, shock-resistant crops, better agricultural technologies, and basic education will allow 
communities to sustain populations using less land and, perhaps, moving away from swidden 
agriculture, as community-based conservation will require some level of sedentariness.  The 
Public Stewardship Fund would offset the opportunity costs in cancelling commercial 
logging concessions and offset incentives to grant more.  The Fund may also be used to 
finance proper management of companies whose concessions are retained.   
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The report expresses need for a major overhaul of current government practices.  
Though great moves have been made in the installation of a democratic government, 
national infrastructure is still weak and the notorious propensity for corruption in the DRC 
will not be overcome easily.  The Governance Fund will therefore be dedicated to strengthen 
political infrastructure.  This is of political relevance to the implementation of community-
based conservation; the suggested community-government relationship will require increased 
and stronger infrastructure nationwide, to ensure adequate man power to converse with 
community groups and oversee conservation activities.  Division of REDD revenue will 
promote fair distribution.  Establishment of three separate funds will simplify the 
distribution process, and emphasis on transparency within the three will prevent previous 
instances of income being absorbed by corrupt institutions.  Continued funding from the 
World Bank should, ideally, be contingent upon such transparency. 
 
 
Regulation of Artisanal Logging 
 
 Artisanal logging has received no direct regulation under the DRC Forest Code, and 
artisanal logging companies have therefore negotiated personal contracts with communities 
in returns for the right to log their forests.  This usually results in the communities being 
provided with less than the rights to their land would be worth, though, in some cases, 
communities make extreme demands which artisanal companies are unable to provide.ccxl  
Because artisanal logging is illegal, it is not regulated, and the environmental and community 
impacts are difficult to quantify.  Logging is opportunistic and, beyond payments in the 
initial agreement and short-term employment, contributes little to local communities.  As it 
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is part of informal economy artisanal loggers often receive low timber prices.  Yet artisanal 
logging inflicts little harm on the environment, as trees are often cut by hand with chainsaws 
and logs transported via bicycle or human labor (thus providing short-term employment to 
locals).ccxli  The practice can also create market access and establish physical routes for local 
producers.ccxlii  The DRC should therefore include artisanal logging within its Forestry Code, 
so that it may be regulated and contribute to the community. 
 In 2008 the USAID Central African Regional Program for the Environment 
instigated a project in the Ituri landscape of the Mambasa Territory, placing regulation of 
artisanal logging in the hands of local communities.  Primary products of artisanal logging in 
the area are planks, beams and rafters sold for production purposes, and in 2005 an 
estimated 60 artisanal logging groups were present in the area covering a total of 11,620ha.  
The Community Based Natural Resource Management project was implemented in the 
Banana zone, an area dependent on Agriculture as the primary mode subsistence.  Prior to 
the 2008 project implementation, local leaders would cede rights to incoming artisanal 
loggers who would strip areas of land, or grant access rights to miners who would then use 
forest areas around mining sites.  This granting of access bred contention within 
communities, and allowed the communities as a whole to gain little from the transactions.ccxliii 
 The Community Based Natural Resource Management project placed 42,500ha of 
forestland under a community management plan, a 25-year management scheme that will be 
redrafted every five years, with each five-year draft submitted to community groups and local 
government for approval.  The project hired a DRC environmental specialist lawyer to 
oversee discussion between forest-dwelling communities and government authorities to 
debate the management plan’s structure, and to analyze past and current logging and forest-
use trends.  Land use plans are allocated to specific areas within the region, with culturally 
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sacred and ecologically sensitive sites being avoided.  Timber harvesting is spatially 
controlled to ensure that tree regeneration is possible.  This factor is extremely fundamental 
to the plan’s long-term success, and is part of the necessity for the 25-year structure.  Local 
committees and inter-village Community Based Natural Resource Management committees 
were established, overseen by NGOs, such as the WCS, in order to facilitate committee 
organization and quell initial conflicts.  These committees were instrumental in the shaping 
of the management plan, and in demarcating distribution of artisanal logging revenues.  
According to the study revenues shall be divided between funding equipment maintenance, 
taxes and permits, compensating logging teams, paying customary tributes to landowners, 
and establishing a village credit union.ccxliv 
 The Banana zone community-management project is an example in which artisanal 
logging can be regulated within the community-based conservation framework, managing 
the scale of the logging and helping bring higher timber prices for loggers and fair payments 
for local communities ceding portions of land.  Agricultural subsistence and preservation of 
cultural and environmentally sensitive areas continued in concurrence with managed artisanal 
logging, illustrating that a properly funded management program with adequate dialogue 
between village communities, local governments, and outside stakeholders, can breed a 
sustainable and mutually beneficial forest management plan. 
 
 
Non-Timber Forest Products 
 
 Though Terborgh, Dugelby and Salafsky study provided a bleak portrayal of the 
feasibility of non-timber forest products as a policy solution, it should not be so quickly 
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disregarded as a conservation method.  Non-timber forest product extraction is less 
environmentally detrimental than timber extraction, commercialization of products may 
bolster income to local communities that already depend on product extraction and sale for 
subsistence, and recognition of non-timber products’ potential increases valuation of forest 
resources, thus increasing incentives to conserve.  The authors’ analysis focused primarily on 
the failure of non-timber forest products as the primary means of offsetting deforestation, 
yet integration of product extraction and some level of commercialization would augment 
the aforementioned policy proposal of community-based conservation.   
Verina Ingram completes a value chain analysis of non-timber forest products in the 
Congo Basin, and sees similar potential.  She cites the honey trade from Cameroon as an 
instance of successful product commercialization, pointing to the formalization of the sector 
as the root of the success.ccxlv  Formalization of honey harvesting and marketing 
strengthened cooperation between producers and intermediaries, and opened wider 
distribution markets that increased trade with urban areas.ccxlvi  This led to a strengthening of 
social and commercial structures, leading to the success of the product’s commercialization.  
Ingram notes that many of the non-timber forest products that would be popular with 
consumers have production chains that would prove unsustainable when faced with 
increased demand, and would require government regulatory intervention, or 
domestication.ccxlvii 
Yet J. E. Michael Arnold and M. Ruiz Pérez analyze the impacts and potentials of 
commercializing non-timber forest products, and conclude that community oversight may 
counter issues of unsustainable exploitation.ccxlviii  The authors note that product harvesting 
asserts direct and indirect pressures on the forest.ccxlix  Competition between local groups for 
certain food products and for prime products for commercialization exacts an indirect 
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pressure, exacerbated by competition from animal population for the same edible goods.ccl  
Similarly, focusing harvest on a few marketable products disrupts the balance of the forest’s 
biodiversity, affecting dependant species.ccli  Direct pressure stems from depletion of the 
harvested species itself, as high valuation and increased market access may bring a sudden 
surge of desire to harvest that exceeds the forest’s sustainable yield.  This notion is 
exacerbated by the fact that many communities harvest in unsustainable ways; it is estimated 
that 40 percent of Gnetum harvesters, a climbing vine used as a protein-rich vegetable and for 
medicinal purposes, harvest in a manner that destroys the vine, the roots, and often the tree 
itself.cclii  Numerous studies have predicted non-timber forest product commercialization 
leading to overextraction or inevitable domestication of certain species; increased access to 
markets and trade would cause some products used for subsistence to be replaced with 
imported goods, and forest products would therefore be harvested only for sale, at high, 
probably unsustainable levels.ccliii   
Arnold and Ruiz Pérez thus clarify the need for monitoring and control of non-
timber forest products extraction.  Monitoring would ensure that certain species are not 
harvested beyond the forest’s sustainable yield, check that competing groups gain equitable 
access to resources, and ensure that the products are being extracted in manners that do 
minimum damage to the forest itself.  They note that traditional methods of top-down 
conservation – namely limiting local access to land through national parks and restricted 
areas – hindered local control of non-timber forest product harvesting levels.ccliv  In this 
sense, non-timber forest product trade may work best when coupled with community-based 
conservation.  However, establishing a management framework within communities who 
may be vying for access to the same resources would be problematic, and conflict resolution 
would likely require government intervention, partially undermining the concept of 
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community-based conservation in itself.  Furthermore, there is a disparity in terms of the 
uses of non-timber forest products that is dependent on economic status.  For those living 
in poverty, the products provide a subsistence safety net in times of hardship.cclv  Yet 
commercialization and marketing of non-timber forest products have high transactions costs 
and high labor opportunity costs, and is therefore not a viable possibility for those living in 
poverty, or for those emerging from it.cclvi  
 In this sense non-timber product commercialization would have the highest 
potential for sustainable success if implemented once community-based conservation 
initiatives are well established, and communities are already generating steady income from 
other sources.  Similarly, once management structures have been firmly established for 
purposes of overall forest management, they may help to develop and oversee product 
harvesting and marketing structures.  Implementation of overall conservation structures 
should have already ascertained which forest areas are prime for which conservation 
methods, and areas most eligible for non-timber forest product extraction may therefore be 
more clearly defined.  Furthermore, ground-level oversight may monitor harvesting 
methods, ensuring that goods are harvested in ways that do not damage the trees or fauna, 
and at levels that do not exceed the sustainable yield.  Non-timber forest products are 
certainly a necessary part of local livelihood, especially in periods of economic and food-
access hardship, and access to them should not be limited.  However, the realities of non-
timber product commercialization are that it is difficult to implement without heavy impacts 
on the forest and, consequentially, on the communities themselves.  While current trade with 
local markets supplements community income, expanding trade to national and international 
markets would be difficult, if not impossible, to achieve without domesticating the goods or 
implementing strict regulation of product harvesting.  Intensive product commercialization 
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may therefore be useful only to buttress other conservation methods, and only in cases 
where specific products have been deemed prime for marketing due to high yields that may 
be harvested sustainably. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Forest Product Certification Systems 
 
Currently, no companies in the DRC are FSC certified.  However, the FSC certifies 
three companies in neighboring Congo, covering almost two million hectares, and more than 
seven million hectares of African forest overall.cclvii  Why, then, are FSC certified companies 
present across Africa and not in the DRC, and how may the DRC increase certification?  
The Convention of International Trades of Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 
(CITES Treaty) prevents harvesting and trade of endangered species.  Yet the Afrormosia 
and Sapelli trees, both listed under Appendix II of the treaty as endangered species, are 
harvested in the DRC and sold on an underground international market.cclviii  The Sapelli tree 
is the sole habitat of the Nudaurelia Oyemensis caterpillar species, one of the most widely 
consumed insect species, accounting for 9600 tonnes of edible caterpillar species sold in the 
capital Kinshasa. cclix   The species is being threatened by extensive logging of the high-value 
Sapelli tree, which is deemed the most valuable tropical timber species at US$850/m3.cclx  
Despite the CITES Treaty designation the DRC has increased exports in recent years and is 
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now the highest exporter of the tree species worldwide.cclxi  Continuation of such practices is 
not only harmful in terms of direct effects on the environment itself, but is detrimental to 
the global reputation of the DRC and the dedication to reform forestry policy.  
Dedication to certification standards and to preexisting regulations such as the 
CITES treaty is therefore an important factor in DRC forestry policy.  However, the hitherto 
lack of certification in the DRC calls for delicate attention to the way funding and 
management infrastructures are developed during initial stages of implementation.  Cashore 
notes that forestry certification is weakly institutionalized in Africa, which he suggests is 
primarily due to governments having focused attention on traditional forest conservation 
methods.cclxii  Certification may therefore be fostered by mere governmental attention to it as 
a conservation method.  Similarly, industry support of certification systems foster stronger 
infrastructures and incentives to certify.  An estimated 80 percent of South Africa’s plantain 
sector supports FSC, which Cashore suggests provides vital cooperative support while 
quelling market access problems.cclxiii  NGO cooperation provides vital support during initial 
certification stages, and continued backing for long-sighted certification success.  NGOs are 
also important for external oversight; some NGOs have been rejecting certification of some 
enterprises as they do not foresee long-sighted success.cclxiv  For example, a group of NGOs, 
including the Native Rainforest Network and the World Rainforest Movement, called for a 
moratorium on select Gabon firms as they saw inadequate management structures and a lack 
of stakeholder consultation.  Furthermore, they suspected negative environmental impacts 
on nearby protected areas, and thus requested that the moratorium be upheld until a more 
stringent environmental analysis was completed by the FSC.cclxv  Support from industry and 
from NGOs is therefore an important factor in successful establishment of certification 
systems in the DRC. 
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The dispersed nature of the DRC’s population, the suggested formalization of 
artisanal logging, and the shift to community based conservation will lead to a prevalence of 
small, community-based forestry enterprises, and certification of these smaller systems must 
therefore be examined.  In a paper backed by the FAO Forestry Group, Matthew D. 
Markopoulos analyzes certification systems based on community-based forest 
enterprises.cclxvi  Enterprises regarded as community based may change depending on global 
context, but share certain characteristics; the labor force live near the harvesting site, 
harvesting operations are small-scale, enterprises are less capital intensive than their 
industrial counterparts, and profits are usually invested locally.cclxvii  Though the size of the 
community-based enterprise may vary from a few small loggers to larger operations 
employing upwards of 100 individuals, they are small-scale enterprises in comparison to 
larger industrial companies.cclxviii  
Cashore notes that community-based enterprises that become FSC certified tend to 
“wane” a short time after certification due to high costs, low economic benefits, problems of 
management structures, and inadequate access to global markets and production chains.cclxix  
Community support of the certification weakens due to these issues, and the author cites 
assistance from external aid agencies as an important factor in enterprises with longevity. 
Implementing certification in the DRC may therefore benefit from cooperating with outside 
donors, particularly in the initial stages.  Furthermore, certification of the community-based 
enterprises should focus on utilizing the FSC’s burgeoning Small and Low-Intensity Forest 
Management scheme, which is geared specifically to small and community-based forestry 
enterprises.  Doing so will not only simplify the procedure, but will somewhat quell market 
access issues through new FSC market access schemes and a new ‘community based’ 
product labeling system being developed specifically for products of this nature.cclxx 
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Markopoulos notes that the economics of the enterprises tend to be localized around 
families or close communities, and extension beyond these realms is highly dependent on the 
cohesion of individual communities and whether they choose to manage the enterprise with 
new or traditional leadership and management structures.cclxxi  The study notes that, in many 
cases, the demands of markets overwhelm enterprises that opt to continue with traditional 
structures.cclxxii  In this sense, certification of small, community-based enterprises could be 
beneficial, so long as the enterprise structures can withstand the demands of increased 
markets.  According to Markopoulos’ study, the distribution of income usually depends on 
the primary intention of certification.  If the primary intention is income generation in itself, 
revenue is dispersed among community members.  Yet areas with low employment levels 
may use revenues to create jobs and bolster employment, cycling income back into the 
system.  Without stable infrastructures such as secure property rights, licensing requirements, 
financial services, and concrete business regulations, income generation based systems may 
undercapitalize enterprises and create instances of low worker payment levels and conflict 
within local communities.cclxxiii  Therefore, much like non-timber forest products, certification 
of community-based systems would be best implemented once the overarching structure of 
community-based conservation has been realized, as property rights and ground-level 
structures will be more concrete.   
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
 The current nature of DRC politics and forestry policy provides a real opportunity to 
move forward in responsible and sustainable ways.  Logging concessions covering vast plots 
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of lands have been granted, though are yet to be acted upon.  The newly democratic 
government has the opportunity to fashion forestry policy in a way that preserves resources 
while concurrently supporting the country’s people.  This opportunity, coupled with the 
DRC’s abundant forest resources, has garnered attention from international actors, spurring 
emphasis on global initiatives such as REDD.  At the same time, this attention has helped 
provide substantial funding from the World Bank and aid from NGOs, and such backing 
will be fundamental to proper implementation of revised forestry policy, especially in initial 
transition periods.   
 Classical forestry conservation methods that exclude local communities from 
policymaking and from access to forest resources have proven unsuccessful, in general and 
in specific cases within the DRC.  Creation of national parks and protected areas that allow 
no access to forest dwelling communities prevent communities from continuing traditional 
subsistence, religious and cultural practices.  The problems inherent in this type of 
conservation mechanism extends beyond ethical issues; such exclusion breeds corruption, 
with local communities continuing to utilize the areas’ resources illegally and often beyond 
sustainable levels, out of feelings of resentment as well as a basic need for survival.  
Furthermore, protecting areas of such magnitude requires a level of policing that is 
logistically infeasible and will likely fall prey to corruption, which is prevalent in DRC 
history.  Similarly, implementation of other forest conservation mechanisms without 
including local communities will face potential pitfalls.  REDD has been criticized for 
overlooking the needs of forest dwelling communities in its policy implementation in much 
the same manner as national park creation, outlining protected areas with little attention 
given to the people dwelling within their boundaries.  Yet REDD faces additional criticism 
for failing to adequately disburse revenues to forest dwelling people, whose land rights are 
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ceded in order to create protected areas.  As one of the World Bank’s focus countries for 
funding under the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility, evading such criticism and 
demonstrating a dedication to economic responsibility is vital to secure continued funding 
and assistance. 
 Community-based conservation should therefore be at the heart of the DRC’s 
forestry policy.  A fundamental aspect of the country’s physical and human geography is that 
a large portion of the population dwells in communities spanning the DRC’s rich forest 
landscape.  A mutuality of interests and responsibilities exists; forestry policy needs to 
consider the rights and livelihoods of these communities, and the communities themselves 
can be fundamental in the policy implementation process.  Many communities have lived in 
the forest areas for numerous generations and thus provide an intimate knowledge of the 
ecosystem and its fluctuations.  This knowledge can be vital to protecting the resource, 
particularly in knowing which areas are prime for conservation and which may be best put to 
other purposes, such as extraction of non-timber forest products.  Furthermore, including 
local communities in the conservation projects creates an incentive to conserve.  When 
access to land and its resources are cut off, there is an incentive to loot the land and harvest 
as much as possible as access is correctly perceived as short-term.  In contrast, involving 
communities in conservation creates a sense of stewardship and thus an incentive to exploit 
resources in sustainable, farsighted ways.  An expectation of stability would therefore be 
necessary to ensure stable and long-term conservation practices. 
 Community-based conservation should therefore be the lynchpin to the DRC’s 
future forestry policy, with an integration of other conservation mechanisms.  
Implementation of community-based conservation as exhibited in the Bikoro Territory trial 
would put ground-level conservation and oversight in the hands of local people, while 
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providing guidance, funding and oversight from higher governmental authorities and non-
governmental organizations.  Yet fundamental to the success of such a scheme is careful 
attention to the allotment of areas, both in terms of the designation of rights to specific 
communities and the focal use of particular areas, such as non-timber forest production 
collection, or ecotourism.  Inclusion of local communities is fundamental to execution of 
this, as forest-dwelling communities tend to have an intimate, long-standing relationship 
with local forest areas, and would therefore know best which conservation methods are most 
suited to which areas.  This said, cooperation of higher levels of government is vital to 
ensure that these communities function harmoniously with other organizations and among 
themselves, and will be especially necessary in early transition periods, where community 
rights, hierarchies and general management structures will likely be tumultuous as the new 
structures settle into place.   
 Structuring community-based conservation is this way will provide a multi-level 
cooperative platform on which to instigate the various other conservation mechanisms.  For 
example, the multi-level structures will ensure considerable dialogue between local 
communities and higher government, so that the needs and rights of local communities may 
be adequately considered during policy creation and implementation.  For instance, the 
criticisms of the REDD scheme’s failure to take into account access rights of forest dwelling 
communities would be quelled, as their voices could be involved in REDD implementation 
procedures, and they may help suggest forest areas most apt for conservation under REDD.  
Similarly, structuring conservation in such a way will help offset issues of leakage, as 
intimate, ground-level oversight of forest use will prevent harvesting popping up in other 
controlled areas.  Furthermore, as one of thirteen countries listed under the World Bank’s 
Forest Carbon Partnership Facility, the DRC stands to receive funding and attention that 
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will be invaluable in proper implementation of forestry conservation mechanisms, ensuring 
continued funding.  Attention to local communities and efforts to offset leakage and other 
REDD-related criticisms will illustrate a dedication to proper forestry policy, and will 
establish the DRC as an environmentally responsible country on the world stage. 
 Visible dedication to sound policy – and, with it, a move away from notoriety for 
corruption – will have a positive impact on forestry certification systems in the DRC.  A 
fundamental aspect of the success of certification systems is trust in the legitimacy of 
product sources at each stage, from producers to national and international consumers.  
Establishing legitimate forestry management systems will help foster this trust, as will the 
accountability and strict oversight of ground level community conservers.  The incentive for 
sustainable practices that community-based oversight fosters will help ensure close attention 
to harvesting and production practices, and the aforementioned differentiation of areas 
prime for conservation under REDD schemes and those that are suited to harvesting will 
further guarantee sustainable practices.   
 Implementation of non-timber forest product harvesting and marketing will function 
in much the same way.  Non-timber forest products, as a buttress to broader conservation 
policies, rather than a primary conservation alternative in itself, can bolster community 
income and allow forest resources to be utilized without timber harvesting.  Illustrating 
dedication to national sustainable forestry practices on the world stage may help increase 
access to international markets, though a simple expansion of preexisting local and national 
markets for non-timber forest products may suffice to bolster income and offset the need to 
harvest.  Furthermore, a balance must be found between increasing forest product 
harvesting and ever-expanding markets to the point where harvesting becomes unsustainable 
and species need to become agriculturally domesticated.  Focusing on national and local 
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markets, rather than pressing to expand international markets, may help maintain this 
equilibrium.  Establishing non-timber product extraction as a legitimate supplement to 
conservation policies will also stress the value of preserving local communities traditional 
rights to and interactions with the forest.  In essence, inclusion of non-timber forest 
products in the policy framework should aim to legitimize and protect the population’s 
preexisting use of the products, safeguarding communities’ rights to continue harvesting 
rather than expanding product marketing beyond sustainable levels.   
In this same way, legitimizing and regulating artisanal logging will permit government 
oversight of a forest activity that already exists, albeit illegally, allowing for sustainable 
harvest levels to be established and harvesting and production regulations to be instigated.  
Dovetailing from this is the introduction of forestry certification systems that focus on 
small-scale, community-based production groups, which could provide certification to legal 
artisanal systems and therefore, through increased access to markets, create further 
incentives to act sustainably. 
Placing forest conservation in the hands of local communities creates an incentive to 
conserve.  Legitimizing the customary rights of forest-dwelling communities and involving 
them in the preservation of their own land would make it their own interest to ensure forest 
resources are used in sustainable ways, in order to safeguard their future homes and 
livelihoods.  Furthermore, implementing community-based conservation as the lynchpin of 
forestry policy would create a harmony between this ground-level conservation mechanism 
and more centralized initiatives such as REDD.  Legitimizing the roles and rights of forest-
dwelling communities would ensure their voices are heard in planning and implementation 
of REDD and other centralized conservation efforts, while the long-term knowledge of the 
forest ecosystems that the local communities can provide will help determine which forest 
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areas may me best suited to which uses.  Ground-level conservation also provides a means 
of overseeing protected areas and harvesting practices, which can be economically and 
logistically infeasible when implemented in a top-down manner.  Allard Blom characterized 
typical top-down, centralized policy structures as “conservation for the people”, and 
basically community-oriented, bottom-up structures as “conservation by the people”.  
Establishing equilibrium between community-based conservation and national policy 
initiatives would implement “conservation with the people”, utilizing the unique knowledge 
of forest-dwelling communities to create and implement sound forestry policy, and shaping 
top-down policies in a way that recognizes the communities’ rights.  Conserving with the 
people in this manner is crucial in moving forward with forestry policy in the DRC, creating 
a farsighted set of policy initiatives that protect a precious environmental resource while 
supplying the economic benefits and community stability to a newly democratic country with 
extensive potential. 
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